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Article
The Supreme Court’s Political Docket: How Ideology 
and the Chief Justice Control the Court’s Agenda and 
Shape Law
BENJAMIN JOHNSON
The Supreme Court is unique among federal courts in that it chooses—using 
the writ of certiorari—which cases it will decide. Justice Brennan once noted that 
this discretionary power is “second to none in importance.” This article examines 
the institutional politics behind this certiorari process. Specifically, it uses an 
original dataset of Justices’ agenda-setting votes from 1986 to 1993 to show how 
Justices use the rules that govern certiorari to pursue ideological goals. In addition,
and in contrast to existing qualitative accounts, the data suggest some Justices
queue off of the Chief Justice’s vote giving the Chief’s vote outsized influence. After 
analyzing the effects of politics at certiorari, the article considers possible reforms 
that might lessen or at least channel the effects of Justices’ policy preferences. To 
that end, the article offers a range of proposals to reform the certiorari process to 
promote transparency, to improve efficiency, and to enhance the Court’s legitimacy.
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INTRODUCTION
A common attack against courts is that they are “political.”1 One need 
look no further than newly-inaugurated President Trump’s assertion that an 
injunction against his executive order on immigration2 was “so political.”3
The President went on to say that he does not “ever want to call a court 
biased, . . . but courts seem to be so political.”4 Politics at the Supreme Court 
are no less divisive, but they are potentially more consequential, since they 
may undermine the Court’s legitimacy5 and judicial review powers.6
Increasingly, Senate confirmation battles focus less on nominees’ 
                                                                                                                         
* Ph.D. Politics, Princeton University; J.D., Yale Law School. Thanks are due to Bruce Ackerman, 
Ian Ayers, Brandice Canes-Wrone, Charles Cameron, Miguel de Figueiredo, Jim Fleming, David Forte, 
Heather Gerken, Leslie Gerwin, Paul Kahn, Al Klevorick, Harold Hongju Koh, Noah Messing, Anna 
Offit, Mark Osler, Nick Parrillo, H.W. Perry, David Rabban, Judith Resnik, Sarah Schindler, Alexander 
Schwab, Alan Schwartz, Sepehr Shahshahani, Kenneth Starr, Sarah Staszak, Keith Whittington, and 
Aaron Zelinsky as well as participants in seminars at the University of Texas, Princeton, and Yale. Any 
mistakes that remain are solely my own.
1 Sometimes this is offered not as an indictment but as an observation. See Richard A. Posner, The 
Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 34 (2005) (introducing 
his main thesis “which is that to the extent the Court is a constitutional court, it is a political body”).
2 Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8, 977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
3 Donald J. Trump, U.S. President, Speech to the Major Cities Chiefs Police Association (Feb. 8, 
2017), in THE HILL (Feb. 8, 2017, 3:40 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-
administration/318525-transcript-of-president-donald-trumps-speech-to-the [https://perma.cc/3D3E-
RJH9].
4 Id.
5 See Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, On the Ideological Foundations of Supreme 
Court Legitimacy in the American Public, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184, 184 (2013) (noting the widespread 
agreement that the Court’s public legitimacy is rooted in its reputation as being “impartial, trustworthy, 
and above . . . politics”). Compare id. at 193 (suggesting the Court’s public legitimacy may be less 
dependent on apolitical procedures), with Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections 
Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1648 (2000) (arguing the Court’s 
conceptual legitimacy is “dependent on its conformity with law”). 
6 See Hartnett, supra note 5, at 1718 (arguing that the Supreme Court is no longer a “passive” or 
“neutral” institution because of its ability to decide which cases to hear (quoting RICHARD L. PACELLE,
JR., THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME COURT’S AGENDA: FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE REAGAN 
ADMINISTRATION 15 (1991) and DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 2 (1980))).
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qualifications than on their perceived politics.7 Legal scholars bemoan the 
influence of politics at the Court,8 and Justices air similar concerns.9
Among the most opaque,10 consequential, and political decisions the 
Court makes in any case is the first one: whether or not to take the case at 
all.11 Justice Brennan called the power to make this decision “second to none 
in importance,”12 while one scholar has gone far enough to suggest that “the 
Supreme Court’s power to set its agenda may be more important than what 
the Court decides on the merits.”13 And yet scholars are divided on the 
question of whether or not the Justices actually use this power to advance a 
political agenda, with answers ranging from always,14 to sometimes,15 to 
                                                                                                                         
7 See Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1189 (1988) 
(hypothesizing that when the public begins to become frustrated with Supreme Court decisions, they use 
the confirmation process to find candidates that share their values and “will read the Constitution not 
according to some eccentric or extremist philosophy, but rather in the way that . . . the People demand??;
Lee Epstein et al., The Changing Dynamics of Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees, 68 J. POL.
296, 296 (2006) (arguing that Senate confirmation hearings are conducted to ensure the nominee shares 
the Senators’ values); Jonathan P. Kastellec et al., Polarizing the Electoral Connection: Partisan 
Representation in Supreme Court Confirmation Politics, 77 J. POL. 787, 788 (2015) (evaluating whose 
opinion matters in “how senators cast votes on Supreme Court nominees”).
8 E.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 6 (2014) (expressing his 
“disappointment” with the Court’s decisions over the years, especially regarding their “[failure] to protect 
people’s rights”); ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A COURT AND 
ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES (2012) (referencing in Preface the well-known criticism that the Justices 
act as “politicians in robes” and introducing the argument that because the “Supreme Court does not 
function as a true court,” it “prevents the American people and our elected leaders from resolving 
[various] issues democratically”); see also Keith E. Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: 
PostBehavioralist Approaches to Judicial Politics, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 601, 606 (noting that many 
scholars have concluded “that judicial decisions simply reflect the political preferences of a majority of 
the Justices on the Court at any given time”).
9 See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128–29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disparaging the 
majority by ending his dissent claiming that while the Nation would never know who truly won the 
election, clearly the Nation has lost their “confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of 
law”); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority’s decision as “an act of will, not legal judgment”).
10 See Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s 
Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 790 (1984) (calling the process “hopelessly 
indeterminate and unilluminating”).
11 See id. at 710 (providing an overview of the different factions that criticize the cases the Supreme 
Court hears and chooses not to hear).
12 William J. Brennan, Jr., The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REV.
473, 477 (1973). Similarly, Justice Marshall said that even the decision not to decide a case is “among 
the most important things done by the Supreme Court.” Thurgood Marshall, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, 
Remarks at the Second Circuit Judicial Conference (Sept. 8, 1978), in THURGOOD MARSHALL: HIS 
SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND REMINISCENCES 177 (Mark V. Tushnet ed., 2001).
13 Hartnett, supra note 5, at 1737.
14 See Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 293 (2005) (“[C]entral 
to positive scholarship is the notion that the Justices are strategic in using their almost unlimited control 
over their docket to manage their agenda along ideological terms.”).
15 See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE 274–82 (1991) (suggesting Justices care about case 
outcomes on certain issues and utilizes certain decision modes depending on how strongly they care 
about the outcome of the case); S. Sidney Ulmer, The Decision to Grant Certiorari as an Indicator to 
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almost never.16 For all the concern generated by political decision making at 
the Court, scholars have struggled to quantify the extent to which politics 
influences the Court’s decisions, pin down where politics enters the 
process,17 or define it in a way that can be measured. This Article proposes 
a more rigorous inquiry based on the following definitions. Justices are 
strategic in that they consider the likely outcome on the merits as they decide 
how to vote at certiorari. They may be ideological in two senses. First, they 
may have policy preferences that are more liberal or conservative. Second, 
they may have judicial philosophies that tend to lead to liberal or 
conservative outcomes. Justices make political decisions at certiorari when 
they vote strategically and ideologically—in the first sense—to advance a 
policy agenda.18
Political decision making that affects the agenda is related to, but distinct 
from, ideological decisions on the merits or justifications and guidance in an 
opinion. Motivated reasoning19 may apply in each circumstance, but they are 
not equivalent. Rather, ideological politics at the agenda-setting stage is 
something like evidence of premeditation. Justices choose to take these cases 
so they can use them as vehicles for ideological advancement later. 
This Article explores how politics infects the Court’s “shadow 
docket,”20 the largest part of which is the set of decisions about petitions for 
certiorari. Certiorari is a tool that the Court uses to take questions that it 
wants to decide and dodge those it wants to avoid.21 This Article presents an 
empirical examination of how ideology can and does influence the cert 
process and the Court’s agenda for the term. The results matter because the 
Court’s docket shapes the course of law, and as that docket shrinks, every 
slot appropriated by Justices’ political votes is a slot unavailable for the 
Court’s more apolitical agenda.
                                                                                                                         
Decision “On the Merits,” 4 POLITY 429, 441 (1972) (noting a close correlation between agenda-setting 
votes and votes on the merits).
16 DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 125–30 
(1980); see also David R. Stras, The Incentives Approach to Judicial Retirement, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1417, 
1430 (2006) (opposing the notion that “Justices are motivated solely by their own policy preferences”).
17 See, e.g., Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections 
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 188 (1968) (suggesting there are politics 
everywhere).
18 Accordingly, the rest of the Article uses the terms ideological and political interchangeably. 
19 See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated 
Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) (describing 
motivated reasoning as “the tendency of people to unconsciously process information—including 
empirical data, oral and written arguments, and even their own brute sensory perceptions—to promote 
goals or interests extrinsic to the decisionmaking task at hand”).
20 William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 4 
(2015) (noting that many “criticize the Court’s merits cases for being political, unprincipled, or opaque. 
But those criticisms may be targeted at the wrong part of the Court’s docket”).
21 LISA KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS HARD CASES AND 
STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 4 (2001)
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The Court is very selective about the cases it takes. Since it grants so 
few petitions, it tries to reserve spots on the docket for only important 
cases.22 But exactly what makes a case sufficiently important is not always 
clear. The Court offers only limited guidance to those who would seek the 
writ, and in practice, the Justices do not rigorously adhere to any standards 
regarding the “certworthiness” of petitions.23 The absence of clear standards 
“exacerbates the ever-present tendency of the Justices to conceive of the case 
selection process in political terms.”24 That is, whether a Justice finds a 
petition to be worthy of certiorari is a function of how important the 
substance of the case is and whether or not the case is likely to advance the 
Justice’s ideological interests. 
Accordingly, any careful, empirical study of agenda-setting at the Court 
must account for both a case’s intrinsic certworthiness and ideological 
effects that push in favor of or against granting the writ. This Article 
develops tools to do just that.25 The only data needed to undertake the study 
is a set of cert votes. Fortunately, Justice Blackmun saved all of his papers 
from his time on the Court.26 Helpfully, Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Segal, and 
Harold Spaeth scanned several years of docket sheets and internal 
memoranda into PDF form and posted the data on the web at the Blackmun 
Archive.27 For this project, the PDF records were hand-coded into useable 
computer data.28 With this rich dataset, there is more than enough data to 
pursue a rigorous empirical analysis of the cert process.
By carefully analyzing the Justices’ votes at the agenda-setting stage 
during the early years of the Rehnquist Court, this Article provides empirical 
support for two distinct claims. First, the Rule of Four,29 which governs the 
cert process, empowers liberal and conservative coalitions to push cases onto 
the docket for ideological reasons. For conservatives, the opportunity is to 
push the law ever more to the right. For the liberals, the hope is to fill up the 
docket with less important cases so the conservatives have fewer 
                                                                                                                         
22 See PERRY, supra note 15, at 34–36 (discussing the absence of a definition of what makes a case 
certworthy and suggesting that the definition is “a case that [they] consider to be important enough to be 
certworthy”).
23 Id. at 34–35 (suggesting that the “ambiguity of Rule 10 is not some unfortunate oversight by the 
Justices” but instead that “[t]hey have intentionally enunciated murky criteria”).
24 Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 10, at 791.
25 The model presented builds on other models of voting at the Court or in legislatures. See, e.g.,
Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
for the US Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 137 (2002) (using the Justices’ votes to 
reverse or affirm at disposition); Joshua Clinton et al., The Statistical Analysis of Rollcall Data, 98 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 355, 356 (2004) (using congressional votes).
26 Harold Hongju Koh, Unveiling Justice Blackmun, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 9, 10–11 (2006).
27 DIGITAL ARCHIVE OF THE PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN (Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & 
Harold J. Spaeth eds., Washington University in St. Louis 2007), epstein.wustl.edu/blackmun.php?p=3
[https://perma.cc/U88C-SZUM].
28 Id.
29 PERRY, supra note 15, at 43–44.
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opportunities to work mischief or to convince a moderate Justice to vote with 
them to collect a rare win.
Second, the empirical analysis highlights the role and influence of the 
Chief Justice, who seems to have a large, and previously unnoticed, effect 
on the composition of the Court’s docket. The Chief Justice’s vote has a 
statistically significant effect on the voting behavior of five of the other 
Justices even after accounting for ideology. This result is quite surprising as 
it contradicts the qualitative evidence on the subject.30 Further, while there 
is a growing awareness that the Chief Justice possesses largely 
unexamined—and possibly unjustifiable—formal powers to shape the 
judiciary,31 the Chief Justice’s influence over the docket is unexplored.32 The 
customary privilege of voting first33 appears to give him an outsized impact 
on the Court’s agenda. Since Justices vote ideologically, the Court’s docket 
may come to reflect the Chief’s idiosyncratic political views instead of 
hewing to the more neutral principles espoused in the Court’s rules.34
This Article is also helpful to better understand the stakes of current 
fights over the Court. The politics over the Court should take seriously the 
politics at the Court in every stage of the Court’s process. The core empirical 
findings about the power of ideology and the Chief Justice strongly suggest 
that personnel is policy, or in the case of the Court, personnel is law. Both 
parties and aligned interest groups engaged in a pitched battle over the last 
open seat on the Court, and there is every chance that one or more seats 
could come open in the next few years. As the Senate and nation evaluate 
potential Justices for the next seat, this Article makes clear that it is at least 
as important to know how the nominee would take cases as it is to determine 
how that person would dispose of cases. The implications extend beyond the 
Court as well; most state supreme courts also control their agenda,35 and 
these findings suggest politics may be at work across the states.
Finally, this Article offers tentative suggestions to amend the cert 
process.36 Previous works address concerns that sometimes the Court takes 
cases it should not and other times it passes on cases it should take. 
Discerning exactly which cases the Court “should” or “should not” take is 
beyond the scope of the present Article. Those who believe the Justices
                                                                                                                         
30 See id. at 85–91 (referencing the Discuss List as an administrative process that is not strategically 
manipulated by the Chief Justice).
31 See Judith Resnik & Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers and 
the Term of the Chief Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575, 1575–76 (2006) (explaining 
the reality of the impact that the Chief Justice can have on American law). 
32 Id. at 1577–78.
33 See PERRY, supra note 15, at 44 (specifying that when votes are required, they are done in order 
of seniority from most senior to most junior Justice). 
34 SUP. CT. R. 10.
35 E.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1067 (1872); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.001 (1987).
36 See infra Part IV (speaking of the problems that threaten the court’s legitimacy and the solutions 
proposed to rechannel the political power).
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should just be umpires would presumably say the Court should take cases 
without regard to ideology and not seek to re-make the law.37 In general 
though, ideology may be a relevant or even necessary consideration under 
different theories; however, it is harder to identify a theory that would award 
the Chief Justice so much sway over the docket. 
This Article proposes a range of specific changes to address the Chief’s 
power and to harness the Justices’ willingness to reason ideologically at 
certiorari.38 First, Congress or the Court could clarify the rules that govern 
certiorari so that there are clearer rules. Second, the Court on its own 
initiative or pursuant to a congressional regulation of the Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction could take steps to promote transparency in the process. 
Specifically, the Court could release the records of the certiorari votes within 
a reasonable timeframe. Third, the Court could change the voting procedures 
by amending the Rule of Four39 or altering the order in which Justices vote 
in conference. Finally, Congress could create an external review body to 
help the Court select cases.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I offers three examples of the 
certiorari process at work. The different strategies and concerns displayed in 
those examples are then considered alongside other possibilities in Part II. 
That Part explains how Justices can—and sometimes do—take advantage of 
the certiorari process to advance a policy agenda. Part III introduces the 
empirical model and results, leaving policy recommendations for Part IV.
I. THREE EXAMPLES
Before turning to the formal and statistical analysis, it is worth 
considering three examples from the Blackmun Archive.40 Justices decide 
how to vote on certiorari based in part on the intrinsic importance of the 
issue or case presented and in part on the likely policy effects that would 
result if the Court granted cert and decided the case. The three examples 
presented here are consistent with different types of voting behavior that 
follow from that assertion. First, some issues are so important that the Court 
simply must take and decide the case regardless of the ideological effects. 
Second, sometimes Justices want to try to keep cases—even important 
                                                                                                                         
37 Cf. Brett M. Kavanaugh, The Judge as Umpire: Ten Principles, 65 CATH. U.L. REV. 683, 685 
(2016) (“At its core, in our separation of powers system, to be an umpire as a judge means to follow the 
law and not to make or re-make the law.”). On the tensions with the umpire analogy in the context of the 
Court, see Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701, 
701–02 (2007). Similarly, Aaron Zelinsky has a thoughtful and historically minded criticism of the 
judge-as-umpire metaphor. See Aaron S.J. Zelinsky, The Justice as Commissioner: Benching the Judge-
Umpire Analogy, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 113, 113–14 (2010) (introducing the “judge-umpire” analogy 
by explaining its history, intent, and inaccuracy).
38 See infra Part IV (proposing to channel or relocate political power within certiorari).
39 Congress could also require such a change as a “Regulation[]” of the appellate jurisdiction.
40 DIGITAL ARCHIVE, supra note 27.
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cases—off of the docket because they are concerned the Court will make a 
decision that will move the law in a “bad” direction.41 Finally, sometimes 
Justices are aggressive and take cases that do not seem important in order to 
advance an ideological agenda. 
Take first, Mistretta v. United States.42 The facts of Mistretta are 
straightforward. John Mistretta sold cocaine to an undercover agent for the 
DEA, and he was convicted for selling a controlled substance.43 He appealed 
his sentence, which was set according to the newly enacted federal 
sentencing guidelines promulgated by the Federal Sentencing 
Commission.44 His appeal asserted that the new guidelines were 
unconstitutional.45 A memorandum circulated to the Court noted that district
courts across the country were divided on whether the new guidelines were 
constitutional or not, and noted that no matter how the Court resolved the 
matter, “a large number of defendants will have to be resentenced.”46 That 
large number was growing on a daily basis, and so it was important that the 
Court act quickly. 
Given the obvious importance of the case, the memorandum 
recommended granting cert.47 All nine Justices agreed, and the Court granted 
certiorari unanimously.48 Justice Scalia voted to grant cert even though he 
ended up dissenting in the case.49 Given the 8-1 outcome, it is almost certain 
he knew that he would be on the losing side, but plainly he recognized it 
would be irresponsible for the Court to wait to decide this question.50
While Mistretta was so obviously important that ideological concerns 
were rendered secondary, some cases are not so overwhelmingly important 
that ideological considerations vanish entirely. When issues or cases appear 
that carry significance, sometimes Justices worry that the Court—if it takes 
the case—will decide the case in a way that will displease the Justices. Such 
                                                                                                                         
41 See infra text accompanying notes 46–47.
42 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
43 Id. at 370; Preliminary Memorandum for No. 87-1904 at 2–5 (June 2, 1988) (on file with 
Washington University in St. Louis), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/blackmunMemos/1988/GM-
1988-pdf/87-1904.pdf [https://perma.cc/XGV8-XJKJ].
44 The Commission was established under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. §§ 
991-998.
45 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 370–371.
46 Preliminary Memorandum for No. 87-1904, supra note 43, at 1–2, 11.
47 Id. at 11.
48 Docket Sheet, Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (No. 87-1904),
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/blackmunDockets/1988/Paid/docket-87-1904.pdf [https://perma.cc/
GTQ4-ETVB].
49 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50 See Preliminary Memorandum for No. 87-1904, supra note 43, at 10–11 (Explaining that the 
district courts have examined this issue and decided it over fifty times, and little would be gained from 
waiting for a court of appeals to decide the issue. It explains further that the district courts have not been 
able to reach a uniform result, so courts of appeals would likely have the same difficulty.); see also 
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361.
590 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:3
Justices may then try to play defense. One possible example of this is 
Murray v. Giarratano, where the Court held states do not have to provide 
counsel in postconviction collateral proceedings in capital cases.51 The 
memorandum summarizing the certiorari petition circulated to the Court 
suggested the lower court decision requiring states to provide counsel 
conflicted with the Court’s recent decision in Pennsylvania v. Finley.52 It 
also noted the Fourth Circuit issued its opinion en banc, so it would have a 
great deal of precedential force, and it would require Virginia to develop and 
fund a system to provide attorneys for offenders. The memorandum 
colorfully stated that “respondent’s arguments for why cert should not be 
granted border on the absurd.”53 Unsurprisingly, the memorandum 
recommended granting cert.54
Justice Blackmun’s own clerk wrote, in a two-page memorandum 
appended to the memorandum, that she agreed that the petition “requires a 
grant of cert.”55 She stated that “the only rationale for denial would be a 
patently defensive one.”56 This “defensive denial” strategy is one through 
which a Justice votes to deny a case because of the risk of making 
unfavorable law.57 Justice Blackmun voted to deny certiorari, as did Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.58
Just as the certiorari process allows some Justices to play defense, at 
times it also allows them to play offense. Consider Employment Division v. 
Smith,59 which worked a sea change in Free Exercise jurisprudence.60 The 
facts of the case were rather straightforward. Alfred Smith was a member of 
the Native American Church, and as a part of a religious ceremony, he 
ingested “a small quantity of peyote for sacramental purposes.”61 This single 
use constituted a violation of his employer’s—a drug treatment center—
                                                                                                                         
51 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
52 Preliminary Memorandum for No. 88-411, 4–5, 9 (Oct. 28, 1988) (on file with Washington 
University in St. Louis), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/blackmunMemos/1988/GM-1988-pdf/88-
411.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5JV-37BG]; see also Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (“[T]he 
right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.”).
53 Preliminary Memorandum for No. 88-411, supra note 52, at 11.
54 Id. at 12.
55 Id. at app. p.1. Her final recommendation was to “Grant (reluctantly)” Id. app. p.2.
56 Id. at app. p.1.
57 PERRY, supra note 15, at 198–207.
58 See Docket No. 88-411 (Aug. 31, 1988) (on file with Washington University in St. Louis), 
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/blackmunDockets/1988/Paid/docket-88-411.pdf [https://perma.cc/
H5JV-37BG].
59 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
60 See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1109, 1111 (1990) (“The Smith decision is undoubtedly the most important development in the law 
of religious freedom in decades.”).
61 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 663 (1988).
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employment policies, as well as of the laws of Oregon.62 The center fired 
Smith, who then applied for unemployment compensation from the State of 
Oregon.63 The Employment Division denied the application because Smith 
had been fired for “misconduct.”64 The Supreme Court of Oregon overturned 
this decision based on First Amendment Free Exercise concerns, and the 
State appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Much of the story is well known and set out plainly in the Court’s 
opinion. What is less well known is that the Court very nearly did not hear 
this case. The case got the bare-minimum level of support necessary to make 
it onto the docket, with Justice Blackmun casting the pivotal fourth vote in 
favor of hearing the case.65 If Blackmun, who ended up in the minority,66
had simply withheld his vote, the Court would not have granted certiorari. 
Thanks to Justice Blackmun, the Court granted cert and remanded the 
case to Oregon for further consideration. Specifically, the Court wanted to 
know whether Oregon recognized a religious-use exception to the state’s 
criminal code for the consumption of peyote.67 In subsequent proceedings, 
the Oregon court held that there was no state religious-use exception to the 
relevant statute.68 Still, the Oregon court maintained that the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibited the state from denying 
benefits to Smith for taking peyote as a part of a religious practice. The state 
again appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, leading to perhaps the most 
important and controversial Free Exercise case of the last several decades.69
But before the Court could write a landmark opinion, it must first take 
the case, and this was not a foregone conclusion. One of Justice O’Connor’s 
clerks authored a memo to the Court70 recommending it deny certiorari. 
According to the memo, Smith was not the “best vehicle” to answer the 
question presented, there was no clear circuit split, and “the impact and 
                                                                                                                         
62 See id. at 662–63, 672 (stating that the possession of peyote amounts to a felony under Oregon 
law).
63 Id. at 663.
64 Id.
65 Cert. Voting Docket Sheet No. 86–496, (Dec. 2, 1986), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/
blackmunDockets/1987/Paid/docket-86-946.pdf [https://perma.cc/XX8L-GHF4].
66 Smith, 485 U.S. at 674 (1988) (Blackmun, J., joining the Brennan dissent).
67 Id. at 673–74.
68 Smith v. Emp’t Div., 763 P.2d 146, 147–48 (Or. 1988), rev’d sub nom., Emp’t Div., Dep’t of 
Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
69 See Gerard N. Magliocca, The Cherokee Removal and the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 DUKE L.J. 
875, 956 (2003) (“Smith is one of the Rehnquist Court’s most controversial holdings, and the Justices are 
still sharply divided on the issue.”); McConnell, supra note 60, at 1110–11 (noting that the Court held 
religious beliefs do not excuse an individual from complying with other laws that a state is free to 
regulate).
70 Drafting the memo was a part of the clerk’s job since Justice O’Connor was a part of the cert 
pool. The cert pool and cert pool memos are more fully described in Part III, infra. See also Preliminary 
Memorandum for No. 88–1213, at 12, (Mar. 17, 1989), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/
blackmunMemos/1989/GM-1989-pdf/88-1213.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CWW-SUHR].
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precedential value of a holding by this Court . . . would be limited.”71 The 
memo’s author has certainly been proven wrong about the impact of the 
precedent,72 but most likely, the clerk could not anticipate such a sweeping 
decision.73 Justice Blackmun’s clerk was a bit more cynical and suggested a 
faction of the Court was more interested in making law than deciding a case. 
In an internal memorandum, one of Justice Blackmun’s clerks noted that the 
majority from Smith I “thought it would get to decide whether religious use 
of peyote is protected by the [F]ree Exercise Clause against state criminal 
prosecution.”74
The Smith II Court seemed to be focused on getting to answer a 
particular question to make a particular change in the law. Smith II was 
certworthy because of the law the majority could make—the law it knew it 
could make—if the Court granted cert.75 That politics was at play is easy to 
see from the voting patterns at cert. Smith provided the same facts and the 
same question both times it came to the Court. The first time, Justice 
Blackmun thought the question was worth resolving, but Justices O’Connor 
and Stevens did not.76 When the case came back, Justice Blackmun saw that 
the Court was likely to go in a direction he would not support, so in the 
second case, he voted to deny cert.77 But Justices O’Connor and Stevens also 
had new opinions about the possibilities of Smith.78 Though the Court had 
no new facts and only a marginally clearer picture of the possibly relevant 
state law, those two Justices changed their minds and voted to grant cert so 
they could answer the question. 
Smith shows how precarious the cert process can be. An enormous result 
hinged on the cert vote of a Justice who would come to dissent in the case. 
It also shows how politics is at play at cert, as Justices changed their minds 
on how certworthy Smith was between Smith I and Smith II, even though 
neither the facts nor the question changed. The only difference was that the 
Justices had a different idea of how Smith II would come out given their 
                                                                                                                         
71 Id. at 12. 
72 In response to the Court’s decision, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)-1 to -4 (noting that the government, through any law, cannot burden the First 
Amendment freedom of religion).  
73 Indeed, Justice O’Connor, for whom the clerk worked, concurred only in the judgment and wrote 
a blistering concurring opinion that claimed that the majority’s holding “dramatically departs from 
well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence, appears unnecessary to resolve the question presented, and 
is incompatible with our Nation’s fundamental commitment to individual religious liberty.” Emp’t Div., 
Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 891 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
74 Preliminary Memorandum for No. 88–1213, supra note 70, at 12. 
75 One of Justice Blackmun’s clerks made this point in an internal memo. The clerk said it was clear 
that the majority in Smith I “thought it would get to decide whether religious use of peyote is protected 
by the Free Exercise Clause.” Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
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deliberations in the first hearing. Smith II shows how the Court can grab a 
case that is not that significant on its own and make law from ideology. The 
Court did this even though it could have reached the same outcome without 
working such a large change in Free Exercise jurisprudence.79
II. POLITICS AND THE RULE OF FOUR
The Rule of Four is perhaps the most famous minority-voting rule in 
politics. When the Justices requested and received control over their docket 
from Congress in 1925, there was a real concern that the Court would take 
too few cases.80 In particular, Congress did not want the Court to focus too 
narrowly on certain types of cases, leaving broad swaths of the legal 
landscape unsupervised.81 The Justices responded that the Court already had 
an institutional remedy for that problem in The Rule of Four.82 Under the 
rule, it takes only four of the nine Justices to commit the Court to review a 
case.83 The Rule provides ideological opportunities for individual Justices, 
minority coalitions, the Court median, and the Court as an institution. It also 
helps keep lower courts in line and expands the types of cases the Court 
hears.84 This Part describes the current certiorari process and the strategic 
opportunities the Rule of Four presents.
A. A Brief Overview of the Process
The Supreme Court has nearly complete control of its docket through 
the certiorari process. However, the Court has not always had such power 
over its docket. Until the Judges’ Bill in 1925, the Court was required to 
decide all cases within its jurisdiction.85 The Judges’ Bill curtailed the 
Court’s mandatory jurisdiction, though it was still technically supposed to 
hear certain types of cases: for example, where a lower court struck down a 
federal statute.86 The Court quickly began to treat this mandatory jurisdiction 
similarly to its discretionary docket and limited review to only those cases 
                                                                                                                         
79 Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
80 John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1983).
81 See Ira P. Robbins, Justice by the Numbers: The Supreme Court and the Rule of Four—Or is it 
Five?, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2002) (describing Justices’ testimony intended to allay concerns 
that increased discretion would result in arbitrary dismissals). 
82 Id. 
83 E.g., Joan Maisel Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 975 (1957).
84 See Stevens, supra note 80, at 20 (noting that “the Rule of Four must inevitably enlarge the size 
of the Court’s argument docket,” given that it allows cases to be heard even when a majority of Justices
deem the case “unworthy of review”).
85 See Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925, 42 HARV. L. REV. 1,
1 (1928) (“To enable the Court to cope with the growth in its business and to conserve its energies for 
issues appropriate to the Supreme Bench, Congress by the Act of February 13, 1925, acceded to the 
Court's desire for drastic limitations upon its jurisdiction.” (footnote omitted)).
86 Mark Tushnet, The Mandatory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court—Some Recent Developments,
46 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 347 (1977).
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with a “substantial federal question.”87 Congress continued to whittle away 
at the mandatory parts of the Court’s jurisdiction, culminating in 1988 with 
the removal of nearly all of the remaining mandatory jurisdiction.88 As a 
result, nearly all parties seeking Supreme Court review of a lower court
decision must seek certiorari. 
The cert process begins when one or more parties in a lower court files 
a petition for a writ of certiorari after a final decision is made by the lower 
court.89 The Court receives thousands of petitions every year. In the October 
2015 term, the Court disposed of over 6,500 cert petitions,90 but that number 
has often exceeded 8,000.91 Of this number, the Court will grant cert to only 
about 1 percent of the petitions.92
Given the sheer volume of petitions, the Court has developed a 
procedure for streamlining the cert process.93 Most Justices belong to the 
“cert pool.”94 Chambers belonging to the pool divide up the work of reading 
and summarizing the petitions between the clerks that work for the 
participating Justices. When a petition arrives at the Court, the case is 
assigned to one of the clerks in the pool. The responsible clerk reviews the 
petition and writes a memo to be distributed to the chambers participating in 
                                                                                                                         
87 PERRY, supra note 15, at 29.
88 Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–352, § 1, 102 Stat. 662. Most of the remaining mandatory 
docket involves cases under the Voting Rights Act or the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. See, e.g.,
Bethune-Hill v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 794, 797 (2017) (noting probable jurisdiction for 
an alleged Voting Rights Act violation); Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464, 1466 (2017) (noting 
probable jurisdiction for an alleged Voting Rights Act violation); McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 
1442, 1444 (2014) (noting probable jurisdiction for an alleged Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
violation).
89 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2012) (establishing the statutory basis for the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction).
90 The Supreme Court, 2015 Term — The Statistics, 130 HARV. L. REV. 507, 514 tbl.II(A) (2016) 
[hereinafter 2015 Statistics].
91 See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 312 (9th ed. 2007) (“[T]he Justices 
consider and dispose of over eight thousand certiorari petitions each term . . . .”); The Supreme Court, 
2009 Term — The Statistics, 124 HARV. L. REV. 411, 418 tbl.II(A) (2010) (noting that during the 2009 
term, the Court disposed of 8,087 petitions).
92 The bulk of the petitions are filed in forma pauperis, and the Court granted only 12 of the nearly 
5,000 such petitions in the 2015 term, or 0.2 percent. The Court is more open to taking cases off of its 
paid docket, granting 69 of 1565 paid petitions, or 4.4 percent. 2015 Statistics, supra note 90, at 514 
tbl.II(B).
93 F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel P. Jordan, Setting the Size of the Supreme Court, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
645, 703–04 (2009) (noting the process seeks “to avoid unnecessary redundancy” by dividing the work 
up across chambers).
94 See Carolyn Shapiro, The Law Clerk Proxy Wars: Secrecy, Accountability, and Ideology in the 
Supreme Court, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 101, 110 (2009) (describing the history and function of the cert 
pool); Adam Liptak, Gorsuch, in Sign of Independence, is Out of Supreme Court’s Clerical Pool, N.Y.
TIMES (May 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/gorsuch-supreme-court-labor-
pool-clerks.html (reporting that currently, Justices Alito and Gorsuch are the only members of the Court 
who are not members of the pool).
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the pool.95 The memo describes the facts of the case, the procedural posture, 
the arguments presented by all parties, and concludes with the author’s 
recommendation of whether to grant or deny the petition.96 The memos are 
often the only information about the petitions the Justices will have.97 Even 
the most certworthy petitions get scant review at the preliminary stage.98
Once the memo is circulated, the next step is the creation of the “Discuss 
List.”99 The Chief Justice circulates a list of cases to be discussed at the 
following conference. Any Justice may add a case to the list. If no Justice
adds a particular case, cert is automatically denied.100 At the conference, the 
Justices vote on whether or not to take the case. Justices may vote to grant, 
deny, or to Join-3.101 Cases that get four grants or three grants and at least 
one Join-3 get certiorari.102 Thus, the Join-3 vote is a sort of weak grant103
that functions as a grant in only certain circumstances.  If three other Justices
vote to grant, then the Join-3 is effectively a vote to grant. If only two vote 
to grant, then the Join-3 functions as a vote to deny. Interestingly, there is a 
strong norm against discussing petitions before the conference, so Justices
do not build cert coalitions prior to conference.104
                                                                                                                         
95 See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 233 (2001) (explaining that the clerks divide 
up who should write each memo and then the memos are “circulated to the chambers whose clerks 
comprise the pool”). 
96 See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari 
Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 973 (2007) (book review) (explaining the standardized format that law 
clerks use to draft memoranda). Generally, the Court’s disposition on petitions for certiorari reflects the 
pool memos’ suggestions. During the October Terms in 1984, 1985, 1991, and 1992, the Court agreed
with the pool memo on approximately 90 percent of petitions. Id. at 991.
97 See REHNQUIST, supra note 95, at 233–34 (2001) (noting that in the vast majority of cases, he 
would only review the pool memo and his clerks’ annotations to it); David M. O’Brien, Join-3 Votes, the 
Rule of Four, the Cert. Pool, and the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779, 
801 (1997) (noting a similar admission from Justice Stevens).
98 Henry Hart estimated that a Justice spends less than twenty minutes in total on the nonfrivolous 
petitions. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 88 (1959). Chief 
Justice Hughes said that petitions received about three-and-a-half minutes of discussion at conference. 
Edwin McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as Conducted by Chief Justice Hughes, 63 HARV.
L. REV. 5, 14 (1949).
99 See PERRY, supra note 15, at 85–89 (discussing the evolution, history, and mechanics of the Chief 
Justice’s “Discuss List”).
100 GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 91, at 15 (“The cases that do not make the discuss list . . . are 
automatically denied review without discussion or vote.”).
101 PERRY, supra note 15, at 48–49.
102 Id. at 43–44, 49.
103 One Justice called it a “timid vote to grant” and another said he used it for cases he “would vote 
to grant, but that [he] wouldn’t put on the discuss list.” Id. at 167–68; see also Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. 
Owens, Join-3 Votes and Supreme Court Agenda Setting 3 (June 8, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1568389 [https://perma.cc/T2HL-4ZD4]
(suggesting the Join-3 reflects collegiality concerns generally and addresses a Justice’s uncertainty in a 
particular case).
104 PERRY, supra note 15, at 147–49, 163.
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The guidelines for what makes a petition certworthy at the initial stage 
are charitably described as imprecise,105 but such as they are, they are located 
in Rule 10 of the Supreme Court’s Rules.106 The Rule emphasizes several 
factors that are of special concern to the Court: resolving circuit splits, 
clarifying federal law, deciding important questions, and rebuking lower 
courts that misstate the Court’s precedent.107 It also specifically says that the 
Court is not generally interested in righting wrongs in particular cases.108 If 
the law is clear, the Court is not interested in taking the case. As Chief Justice 
Vinson put it:
The Supreme Court is not, and never has been, primarily 
concerned with the correction of errors in lower court 
decisions. . . . The function of the Supreme Court is . . . to 
resolve conflicts of opinion on federal questions that have 
arisen among lower courts, to pass upon questions of wide 
import under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United 
                                                                                                                         
105 One commentator calls them “tautological[].” PERRY, supra note 15, at 34.
106 This is Rule 10 in its entirety:
Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari 
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial 
discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling 
reasons. The following, although neither controlling nor fully measuring the 
Court’s discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the Court considers: 
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict 
with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important 
matter; has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with a 
decision by a state court of last resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower 
court, as to call for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power; 
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question 
in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a 
United States court of appeals; 
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an 
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this 
Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with 
relevant decisions of this Court. 
A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists 
of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.
SUP. CT. R. 10.
107 Id.
108 Id. There appears to be a bit of a fuzzy line between the Court’s stated desire to not be a court 
of error correction and its concern to police lower courts that diverge from its precedents. The latter 
would seem to be an error, and yet the Court expresses an interest in correcting it. The relevant distinction 
seems to be between law and fact. The Court is unlikely to review a decision that misapplies Supreme 
Court precedent to facts, but will review when a court misstates law.
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States, and to exercise supervisory power over lower federal 
courts.109
Given the importance of the process and the interesting mix of discretion 
and institutional rules, scholars have not been idle in studying the cert 
process. There is wide agreement that splits, whether between lower courts 
or between a lower court and the Supreme Court’s precedents, draw the
Court’s attention.110 Scholars also tend to agree that the Justices are 
sophisticated voters at the cert stage.111 There is a rather robust finding that 
Justices tend to vote to grant cert in cases where they reverse.112
Interestingly, previous work has not found such votes to be ideologically 
motivated, though there is evidence that in cases where a Justice wants to 
see a lower court affirmed, cert votes are focused on the likely outcome of 
cases.113 And scholars have amassed qualitative and quantitative evidence 
that Justices withhold their votes for cert when they worry the Court will 
reach an unfavorable outcome if the Justices grant cert.114 Despite these 
findings, scholars still dispute whether the Court really is outcome motivated 
at the cert stage.115 The remainder of this Part describes possible strategies 
Justices could—if motivated by outcomes—pursue at certiorari.
                                                                                                                         
109 PERRY, supra note 15, at 36 (quoting Address of Chief Justice Vinson before the American Bar 
Association, Sept. 7, 1949, 69 S. Ct. v, vi). Most formal models focus mainly on the supervisory power. 
See, e.g., Charles M. Cameron et al., Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model 
of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101, 101 (2000) (studying how the 
certiorari decisions enforce the Court’s “doctrinal preferences . . . within the judicial hierarchy”); Jeffrey 
R. Lax, Certiorari and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy: Discretion, Reputation and the Rule of 
Four, 15 J. THEORETICAL POL. 61, 61–62 (2003) (developing a “formal model of the judicial hierarchy” 
to better understand how certiorari allows the Court to “compel compliance” and determine “which 
battles to fight with the lower courts”).
110 Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1120 (1988); Stras, supra note 96, at 981–83; see also
S. Sidney Ulmer, The Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions: Conflict as a Predictive Variable, 78 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 901, 906–11 (1984) (providing statistical data analyzing the Court’s conflicts); S. Sidney 
Ulmer, Conflict with Supreme Court Precedent and the Granting of Plenary Review, 45 J. POL. 474, 
474–77 (1983) (using statistical data to show the Court’s attention to circuit splits).
111 Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 549, 561–71 (1999); Jan Palmer, An Econometric Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Certiorari Decisions, 39 PUB. CHOICE 387, 393–96 (1982).
112 JAN PALMER, THE VINSON COURT ERA: THE SUPREME COURT’S CONFERENCE VOTES 59–62
(1990); PROVINE, supra note 16, at 107–10.
113 See Sara C. Benesh, Saul Brenner, & Harold Spaeth, Aggressive Grants by Affirm-Minded 
Justices, 30 AM. POL. RES. 219, 221 (2002) (collecting studies to this effect).
114 See PERRY, supra note 15, at 198–207 (describing the existence of defensive denials in judging); 
Mark V. Tushnet, Defensive Denials, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 256 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2005); infra Part II.B.
115 Compare Friedman, supra note 14, with PROVINE, supra note 16, at 125–30, 172; see also Stras, 
supra note 16, at 1430 (opposing the notion that “Justices are motivated solely by their own policy 
preferences”).
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B. Defensive Denials 
The most obvious feature of the Rule of Four is that it makes certiorari 
contingent on the agreement of a defined number of Justices.116 Absent 
ideology, the Justices would simply vote for cases they think are intrinsically 
important and against those they think less so. But once Justices factor in 
ideological concerns, they must weigh the ideological costs and benefits 
against the importance of the case. If a Justice wants to take a case, then 
voting to take the case is a meaningful step in that direction. Similarly, 
voting to deny the petition makes it more likely the case will not be heard.
Stated this way, there is an obvious strategy: vote for what you like and 
against what you dislike. But this intersects awkwardly with the Court’s 
presumed obligation to take certain important cases. 
When ideological considerations cause a Justice to vote to deny 
certiorari in a case that is important enough that she would otherwise vote to 
grant, the Justice casts what is called a “defensive denial.”117 The Giarratano 
case mentioned in the introduction is one example.118 Another seemingly 
clear instance of this strategy is Florida v. Riley.119
In Riley, the Court had to decide whether surveilling residential property 
from a helicopter 400 feet above the ground constitutes a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.120 The Court had previously ruled in California v. 
Ciraolo that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy from “naked-
eye observation of the curtilage by police from an aircraft lawfully operating 
at an altitude of 1,000 feet.”121 The cert pool memo122 recommended a grant 
because there was a split on the issue, and the increasing use of police 
helicopters seemed to make resolution of this question worth the Court’s 
time.123
                                                                                                                         
116 Leiman, supra note 83.
117 See Udi Sommer, Beyond Defensive Denials: Evidence from the Blackmun Files of a Broader 
Scope of Strategic Certiorari, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 316, 319 (2010) (defining a “defensive denial” as 
occurring when a Justice votes to deny certiorari despite disagreeing with the lower court’s decision, as 
they will likely lose on the merits). The defensive denial has been studied at length in the political science 
literature. See generally Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic 
Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J. POL. 824 (1995) 
(studying “the extent to which Justices consider the relative likelihood of winning on the merits when 
deciding to grant or deny review,” and thereby, the prevalence of defensive denials); Caldeira et al., supra
note 111 (studying the extent to which Justices acted on certiorari petitions with the future decision on 
the merits in mind).
118 Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); see supra pp. 590.
119 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
120 Id. at 447–48.
121 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986). 
122 The author was a clerk for Justice White.
123 Preliminary Memorandum for No. 87-764-CSY at 7, (Jan. 25, 1988), 
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/blackmunMemos/1988/GM-1988-pdf/87-764.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TJ5K-3SQN].
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Justice Blackmun’s clerk recognized that the split was sufficient so that 
“cert would not be unwarranted.”124 But she also noted that Blackmun had 
been in the dissent in Ciraolo, and presumed that the Justice “was not eager 
to further curtail individuals’ privacy interest in being free from aerial 
surveillance.”125 Given his policy preferences—and correctly predicting the 
likely outcome in the case—she “recommend[ed] defensive denial.”126
Blackmun took her advice and voted to deny the petition. 
Despite Blackmun’s strategic vote, the Court took Riley anyway. In what 
will be a recurring theme throughout this Part, strategic voting can improve 
the chances of a favorable outcome, but it does not guarantee such an 
outcome. Blackmun’s vote made it less likely the Court would take Riley,
but the Court took the case anyway.
C. Aggressive Grants 
In contrast to defensive denials, aggressive grants occur when a Justice
sees enough positive ideological potential in a case that the vote shifts from 
deny to grant. In such an instance, the Justice can hope her cert vote pushes 
a favorable—if not obviously certworthy—case onto the docket where the 
Court is likely to make a decision more to that Justice’s liking. Once again, 
there is a conflict between the aggressive grant and the desire to focus on 
“important” cases. Where the defensive denial aims to prevent the Court 
from taking a case it “should,” the aggressive grant attempts to get the Court 
to take a case it “should not.” The previously described Employment 
Division v. Smith127 appears to be one example of an aggressive grant. Recall 
that in the pool memo, Justice O’Connor’s clerk recommended denying the 
petition, but O’Connor and the other conservatives took the case anyway.
The aggressive grant is particularly appealing when there is only a 
limited downside if the case turns out unfavorably. One possible example of 
this phenomenon is South Carolina v. Gathers.128 In 1987, the Supreme 
Court held in Booth v. Maryland that victim impact statements presented 
during the sentencing phase of a capital case violate the Eighth 
Amendment.129 The Court reasoned that information about a murder victim 
that is “irrelevant to the [defendant’s] decision to kill,” but could undermine 
“reasoned decisionmaking” by playing on jurors’ emotions violated the 
Constitution.130 Justice Powell authored the opinion for a five-member 
                                                                                                                         
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
128 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
129 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987).
130 Id. at 505, 509.
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majority.131 Justice White wrote a dissent signed by all dissenting Justices
and also signed Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion.132 Two years later, 
Justice Powell had retired and been replaced by Justice Kennedy, who had 
expressed a desire to overturn Booth.133 In Gathers, the conservatives took 
their chance.  
Gathers seemed like an unlikely candidate for cert. The case lacked 
many of the features associated with a successful cert petition. There was no 
split in the lower courts. There was no dissenting opinion below. The law 
was clear. Internally, the recommendation from the clerk assigned to 
summarize the petition for the Court recommended the Court deny the 
petition “[u]nless the Court wishe[d] to reconsider Booth.”134 In a private 
memo to Justice Blackmun, one of his clerks agreed the case was not 
certworthy, but did say that if the conservatives wanted to overturn Booth,
“this case for them is as good as any.”135 When the Court met in conference 
to decide whether to grant cert and take the case, four conservatives 
(Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy), and only the four 
conservatives, voted to take the case.136
In Gathers, essentially none of the Rule 10 factors were in play. What 
was possible was that the replacement of Powell with Kennedy had opened 
the door for the conservatives to establish their preferred reading of the law. 
This situation was somewhat ideal from their perspective, as even if they 
lost, the law would only remain the same. This was essentially a no-lose 
proposition, even if they were not guaranteed a win. As it turned out, they 
did not win. Though their cert strategy worked, and they got the case they 
wanted onto the docket, the Court upheld Booth with Justice White voting 
to leave Booth untouched.137
D. Minority-Enhancing Strategies
The Rule of Four is obviously a minority-voting rule (at least when there 
are nine Justices on the Court). It stands to reason that the rule should benefit 
minority coalitions. While this seems plausible, there has been little effort to 
explain exactly what benefits the Rule provides to these coalitions. After all, 
this only puts the case on the docket. Once taken, the majority will dispose 
                                                                                                                         
131 Id. at 497.
132 Id. at 515 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133 Preliminary Memorandum for No. 88-305-CSY 7 (Sept. 27, 1988),
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/blackmunMemos/1988/GM-1988-pdf/88-305.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5E7A-QSV6] (citing Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Cert. Docket Sheet South Carolina v. Gathers, No. 88-305, http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/
blackmunDockets/1988/Paid/docket-88-305.pdf [https://perma.cc/JV27-L992].
137 South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 812 (1989) (White, J., concurring) (“Unless Booth v. 
Maryland is to be overruled, the judgment below must be affirmed. Hence, I join JUSTICE BRENNAN's
opinion for the Court.” (citations omitted)).
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of the case; so, it is a bit unclear what the actual benefit is. Put differently, 
the minority cannot decide a case, write an opinion, or set any policy on its 
own, which raises the question: what, if any, benefit is there to a minority 
coalition from having the power to force a case onto the docket?
The Rule of Four provides different opportunities to minority coalitions 
depending on prevailing conditions. The unifying feature of all of the 
advantages is that the Rule of Four lets the minority force the Court to take 
a case the majority wants to avoid. There are times where a minority 
coalition can put the majority in a tight place politically. At other moments, 
the minority might be able to take a case where they can peel off a member 
of the usual majority coalition and actually win. The Rule of Four also allows 
a minority of the usual winning coalition to push cases onto the docket to 
promote an ideological agenda. Finally, and perhaps most intriguingly, the 
Rule of Four might allow a minority coalition to clutter up the docket and 
limit the ability of the majority to work mischief.
1. Political Hardball
Suppose conservatives make up a 5-4 majority on the Court. A lower 
court decides a case on a hot political topic, and the Court majority does not 
want to take the case because it will be forced to reach an unpopular outcome 
or compromise on a matter of principle. If it is up to the majority, the Court 
will deny certiorari and leave the matter alone. But the liberal minority can 
force the Court to take the case anyway. Now, the conservatives must face 
the choice they wished to avoid. They must now either give the progressive 
Justices the policy they want or face the wrath of Congress.
A possible example of this phenomenon comes from Ledbetter v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber.138 The issue in that case involved the statute of 
limitations for certain claims under Title VII.139 Specifically, Ledbetter sued 
Goodyear for sexual discrimination, arguing that her negative performance 
reviews were the result of sexual discrimination.140 A jury agreed with her, 
but Goodyear appealed the outcome on the basis of the statute of 
limitations.141 Goodyear argued that Ledbetter could not recover for 
damages incurred prior to the 180-day window preceding Ledbetter’s EEOC 
claim, and since any improper discriminatory payment decision happened 
long before that, the statute of limitations had lapsed before the EEOC 
complaint was filed.142 Ledbetter argued that each paycheck that was less 
than that received by a man was a separate act of discrimination.143 There 
                                                                                                                         
138 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
139 Id. at 623.
140 Id. at 622.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 See id. (“Ledbetter introduced evidence that during the course of her employment several 
supervisors had given her poor evaluations because of her sex, that as a result of these evaluations her 
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was a circuit split on this issue, and the Court granted certiorari on June 26, 
2006, and set argument for that November.144
The politics of the issue were tricky. Ledbetter was a decidedly 
sympathetic plaintiff. Ledbetter presented a challenge to the conservative 
majority on the Court, as ruling against Ledbetter would be unpopular with 
the public and with the new Congress that had just flipped to the Democrats. 
Further, if it ruled against her, the Court could elevate this as an issue in the 
upcoming 2008 presidential election, which could harm the Republicans’ 
chances to retain the White House.   
There is little reason to believe the conservative majority should want to 
take this case at this moment. Their preferred outcome would risk popular 
and legislative backlash, and insofar as the Justices are concerned with 
presidential elections,145 it threatened the conservatives’ preferred party. 
This suggests that if they could have, they would have preferred to deny 
certiorari and resolve the underlying circuit split at a later time. But under 
the Rule of Four, the liberal bloc had the votes to force the case onto the 
docket. 
For the liberal bloc, Ledbetter was a win-win. If the conservatives wilted
under the political pressure, the result was an expansive reading of Title VII. 
If the conservatives stuck to their principles, the result was political pressure 
against the conservative majority, a possible legislative response that would 
overturn the decision, and an increased chance the Democrats win the 
following presidential election. 
As it turns out, the conservatives ruled against Ledbetter in a decision 
that was widely covered and was turned into “a cause celebre”146 by 
“Democrats and legal groups on the left.”147 The case became an issue in the 
2008 elections, and Ledbetter herself spoke at the DNC and was featured in 
campaign commercials for then-Senator Obama.148 After Obama took office, 
                                                                                                                         
pay was not increased as much as it would have been if she had been evaluated fairly, and that these past 
pay decisions continued to affect the amount of her pay throughout her employment. Toward the end of 
her time with Goodyear, she was being paid significantly less than any of her male colleagues.”).
144 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 548 U.S. 903 (2006) (granting certiorari).
145 See Adam Liptak, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, No Fan of Donald Trump, Critiques Latest Term, N.Y.
TIMES (July 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/11/us/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburg-no-fan-of-
donald-trump-critiques-latest-term.html [https://perma.cc/6QBA-6XZ8] (“‘I can’t imagine what this 
place would be—I can’t imagine what the country would be—with Donald Trump as our president,’ she 
said. ‘For the country, it could be four years. For the court, it could be—I don’t even want to contemplate 
that.’” (quoting Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg)).
146 Robert Barnes, Exhibit A in Painting Court as Too Far Right, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/04/AR2007090401900.html
[https://perma.cc/UY64-YZAK].
147 Id.
148 Mary Jo Shafer, Jacksonville’s Ledbetter Featured in Obama Ad, ANNISTON STAR, Sept. 28, 
2008.
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the Democrats passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,149 which 
amended Title VII to effectively reverse the Supreme Court’s decision.150
Given this largely foreseeable sequence of events, one would imagine 
the conservative majority would have preferred to take a pass on Ledbetter.
While we cannot know for sure, since the cert votes have not been made 
publicly available, it would not be surprising if the four more liberal 
members of the Court pushed the case onto the docket. Ledbetter points to a 
set of circumstances where the Rule of Four lets the minority coalition play 
political hardball and put the majority between a rock and a hard place.
2. Forcing the Reluctant Median
For the past several decades at least, legal scholars and political 
scientists have generally thought of the Court as breaking down along a 
left-right continuum.151 While this often gets reduced, especially in the 
popular press, to the assertion that there are two blocs that usually vote in 
lockstep, there is also the recurring theme of the “swing” Justice. Since the 
retirement of Justice O’Connor, most observers think that Justice Kennedy 
is the pivotal member of the Court,152 who in many, if not most, cases votes 
with the conservative faction.153
Imagine for a moment that this swing Justice is something of a free 
agent, unbeholden to a liberal or a conservative bloc. If the other Justices
have a clear sense of what the swing Justice will decide to do in a particular 
case, they can alter their cert votes accordingly by voting to grant in cases 
where the median agrees with the swing Justice’s own preferred outcome. 
In contrast, if the majority rule governed at cert, the swing Justice would be 
able to set the agenda and decide the case as the pivotal voter in both rounds. 
The median would not only be able to dictate the answers at disposition; she 
would also be able to pick her own questions. That would be a tremendous 
power for a single Justice.
                                                                                                                         
149 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–2, 123 Stat. 5.
150 See id. (“Congress finds the following: (1) The Supreme Court in [Ledbetter] significantly 
impairs statutory protections against discrimination in compensation that Congress established and that 
have been bedrock principles of American law for decades. The Ledbetter decisions undermines those 
statutory protections by unduly restricting the time period in which victims of discrimination can 
challenge and recover for discriminatory compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the intent 
of Congress.”).
151 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Moffett, Four Predictions about President Trump’s Supreme Court,
WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2016/11/23/four-predictions-about-president-trumps-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/92RP-
E3BZ] (analyzing potential Trump Supreme Court picks on a liberal-conservative scale).
152 See, e.g., Ariane de Vogue, Travel Ban, Religious Liberty Cases Could Keep Swing Vote 
Kennedy Around, CNN (June 26, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/26/politics/anthony-kennedy-
supreme-court-monday/index.html [https://perma.cc/JYL6-M349] (describing Justice Kennedy as a 
“swing vote” on the Court).
153 Douglas M. Parker, Justice Kennedy: The Swing Voter & His Critics, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 317, 
318 (2008).
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The Rule of Four lets the competing factions have a say in this scenario. 
For the liberal Justices who are usually in the minority, they can wait for 
cases that will bring the swing Justice on board. The conservatives may feel 
they can take more risks if the swing Justice is usually with them and take 
cases that could move the law to the right, even if the pivotal Justice is not 
particularly interested in that case or issue.
Moreover, there are areas of the law where the traditional left-right 
distinction breaks down.154 If there are dimensions on which Justices who 
are often in the minority can cobble together a majority by peeling off one 
or two Justices from the usual majority coalition, that provides another 
opportunity for the Rule of Four to make a difference and gives Justices who 
normally find themselves in dissent a pathway to victory. 
Importantly, the minority can do this without the initial support of the 
defecting Justice. That Justice may not wish to take a case that will split the 
usual majority for collegiality reasons; she may not think the area of law is 
particularly important, etcetera. Still, the minority can use the Rule of Four 
to push the case onto the docket and collect the defector’s vote at disposition 
to secure the win.
3. Stuffing the Docket
It is well known that the Court takes fewer cases these days than it did 
in earlier eras. The Court has decided no more than seventy-seven cases 
during any term in the Roberts era, and it has decided less than eighty cases 
in every year since 2000, when it issued eighty-one opinions.155 Under 
Roberts, the Court decides on average just over seventy opinions a year. 
While the Court could always take more cases—indeed, the Court took 111 
cases in 1992 and over 150 cases through much of the 1970s and 1980s—in 
practice it does not seem willing to go much beyond eighty cases a year.156
Given this empirical regularity, the Rule of Four creates an opportunity for 
minority coalitions to crowd the docket. If there are only about seventy to 
eighty slots available in a given term, every case placed on the docket by the 
minority takes up a slot that otherwise might be filled by ideological 
opponents in the majority. Several types of cases might be candidates for a 
minority coalition interested in using this strategy to limit its overall losses. 
First, it may want to take cases that the Court will decide unanimously.
By definition, the minority coalition would be a part of the “winning” 
coalition in a unanimous decision. If the minority bloc can substitute a 
                                                                                                                         
154 The obvious example is formalism in criminal cases. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 
296, 297 (2004) (in which Justice Scalia, a conservative, wrote for a 5–4 majority joined by liberal 
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg as well as conservative Justice Thomas).
155 SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu [https://perma.cc/7XXG-3JUU] (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2018). The numbers include signed opinions, per curiam opinions, or judgments following oral 
arguments. 
156 Id.
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unanimous case for one it would lose narrowly, it will almost certainly be 
better off on the ideology dimension. Second, the minority may be able to 
take a case they care little about but is of particular interest to a possible 
swing Justice. For instance, even if Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg 
did not care deeply about whether judge-found facts were inappropriate to 
use as the basis for a sentencing enhancement,157 if Justice Scalia did care 
about advancing his formalist agenda in this area, these other three Justices
could join with him to grant cert and be on the winning side. This provides 
an additional reason to pick cases where the minority coalition could pick 
off a member of the usual majority. Even if this case is of little importance 
to the minority coalition, taking this case may take up a slot that would 
otherwise go to a case they would lose.
One may object that the argument as presented relies on the Court taking 
only a fixed number of cases. As the Court could always take more cases, 
this seems to be a questionable assumption. However, as an initial matter, 
there is an empirical reality that the Court does not take more than eighty 
cases a year. The finite docket may not be an actual constraint, but the Court 
seems to treat it as though it were. But more importantly, this ability to stuff 
the docket does not rely on the Court only taking a limited number of cases. 
As the docket increases, the cost of deciding cases—for example, the 
time reading briefs, hearing arguments, writing opinions, etcetera—
increases, and there is value in stuffing the docket. Put differently, if the 81st
case is costlier to decide than the 80th, and the 82nd is costlier than the 81st,
and so forth, then there are times the minority bloc would prefer to stuff the 
docket. The reason is the traditional comparison of marginal costs and 
benefits. If the 79th case is less costly than the 80th, then there is a set of 
cases that are sufficiently important and would provide the majority with a 
sufficiently large ideological payoff that they would want to take the case as 
the 79th, but the importance and ideology are not large enough to pay the 
higher cost if it were to be the 80th case. Accordingly, cases that are 
somewhat important and give a small to medium ideological gain to the 
majority bloc—and presumably a corresponding loss to the minority bloc—
might be passed over if the docket is already sufficiently large. Very 
important cases or cases where the majority could achieve a significant 
policy victory might still find their way onto the docket despite the 
docket-stuffing strategy because the payoff is high enough to justify paying
the higher cost for taking another case on an already-crowded docket. But at 
the margin, the minority bloc can block some losses by stuffing the docket 
even if the Court is unconstrained in how many cases it takes.
Finally, and perhaps most surprisingly, it is possible that the minority 
bloc would even be willing to lose cases they find unimportant to pursue this 
                                                                                                                         
157 See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301 (“This case requires us to apply the rule we expressed [in a previous 
case]: ‘Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’”).
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blocking strategy. Suppose a Justice does not care much about tax law and 
taking an additional case can keep some cases the Justice does care about, 
and will lose, off of the docket. In that instance, it seems clear the Justice
would be happy to lose on the tax issue. Even if it is an area of the law the 
Justice does care about, if the law is already bad from her perspective, then 
taking another case in this area that will leave the law in the same or a 
similarly bad place may be a small price to pay to keep a case off of the 
docket where the majority coalition could actually move the law enough to 
cause the minority Justice real pain.
This raises an interesting question: what prevents the minority bloc from 
taking the first eighty meaningless cases that come along to keep the Court 
majority from doing mischief? The answer is simply that if the minority was 
so blatant, the majority could change the Rule of Four.158 The Court did 
something similar regarding the practice of “holding” cases. The Court will 
occasionally hold a case pending the outcome of a related case. It used to be 
the Court would hold a case when three Justices requested it. Death penalty 
opponents on the Court used this rule to hold death penalty appeals that the 
Court would otherwise reject, thus delaying the execution. As a result, the 
majority eventually changed the rule to require four votes to hold a case.159
This suggests that if a minority coalition presses this advantage too far, it 
could lose it entirely.
E. Majority Benefits
These possibilities generate real benefits for Justices in the minority, but 
they raise the question of why a majority allows the Rule of Four to continue. 
If the minority is regularly inconveniencing the majority, the majority should 
simply eliminate the Rule of Four; the Rule is customary not statutory.160 So
scholars must account for the continuation of the rule as a part of the cert 
process.
                                                                                                                         
158 See Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 529 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (“The ‘rule of four’ is not a command of Congress. It is . . . fair enough [as a] rule of thumb 
on the assumption that four Justices find such importance on an individualized screening of the cases 
sought to be reviewed. The reason for deference to a minority view no longer holds when a class of 
litigation is given a special and privileged position.”).
159 See Mark Tushnet, “The King of France with Forty Thousand Men”: Felker v Turpin and the 
Supreme Court’s Deliberative Processes, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 163, 181 (1996) (“[A] month before 
Marshall himself retired, the justices voted to require four votes to hold cases. . . . For Marshall, however, 
it was purchased at the cost of the decent consideration that people sentenced to death ought to receive 
from the nation’s highest court.”).
160 See, e.g., Ferguson, 352 U.S. at 529 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The ‘rule of four’ is not a 
command of Congress. It is . . . fair enough [as a] rule of thumb on the assumption that four Justices find 
such importance on an individualized screening of the cases sought to be reviewed. The reason for 
deference to a minority view no longer holds when a class of litigation is given a special and privileged 
position.”).
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A few possibilities present themselves immediately. First, the Court may 
worry that eliminating the Rule of Four would draw a Congressional 
response. Congress may respond by mandating the Rule of Four, or worse 
(from the Court’s perspective), reducing the discretion the Court has over its 
own docket.161 Second, it may be that Justices recognize that their careers 
are likely to be long, and there may come a day when they will be in the 
minority. If a majority of Justices expect the Rule to be beneficial to them 
over time, they may want to keep it as insurance.
Also, Justices may be concerned about overlooking important cases. 
Justices have different preferences regarding areas of law and believe that 
the Court should be more or less active in different areas. The Rehnquist 
Court had a healthy contingent of Justices from the western United States162
and these Justices were attuned to cases involving water rights.163 The Rule 
of Four made it easier for this western bloc to force the Court to take 
important water cases the majority would have missed because other Justices
were less attuned to questions involving water rights. So, one way the Rule 
of Four benefits the majority is by making it easier for a larger variety of 
cases—reflecting different substantive interests of Justices—to make the 
docket.  
Jeff Lax provides a third and more intriguing justification.164 He argues 
that the Rule is actually median enhancing.165 That is, the median Justice
agrees to the Rule of Four because it credibly binds her to take certain cases. 
Suppose a lower court does not follow Supreme Court precedent exactly.166
Instead, it deviates slightly, but not enough so that the Court median wants 
to take the time and spend the resources to correct the error. Though the 
Court median does not want to take the case, if forced to take it, she will 
enforce her preferred rule and overturn the lower court. 
Now view this framework from the perspective of the lower court. If the 
Court followed a majority rule at the cert stage, the lower court would be 
free to deviate from the Court’s preference because the median does not 
                                                                                                                         
161 Possible Congressional actions related to the certiorari process are addressed in Part IV.B, infra.
162 Though born in Wisconsin, Rehnquist was educated in California and practiced law in Arizona 
for 16 years. William H. Rehnquist, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/william_h_rehnquist
[https://perma.cc/796W-RWXM] (last visited Jan. 13, 2018). O’Connor was born in Texas, educated in 
California, and was a state senator and judge in Arizona. Current Members, SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx [https://perma.cc/NZ2R-QTL4]
(last visited Jan. 13, 2018). Justice Kennedy was born and raised in California and served on the Ninth 
Circuit before being elevated to the Court. Id.
163 See, e.g., Docket Sheet at 1, Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989) (No. 88-309),
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/blackmunMemos/1988/GM-1988-pdf/88-309.pdf [https://perma.cc/
L8J9-UAZW] (concerning water rights).
164 See Lax, supra note 109, at 68 (“I show that this rule increases the power of the median Justice
by increasing lower court compliance with her/his preferred legal doctrine. Ironically, it strengthens the 
median Justice by reducing her/his pivotal power.”).
165 Id.
166 The Court’s precedent is presumed to be at the median’s ideal point.
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think it is worth the effort. But the median Justice is not pivotal under the 
Rule of Four. The Justice just to the right of the median patrols deviations 
by liberal circuits, and Justices to the left of the median are on the lookout 
for conservative attempts to violate precedent. This dramatically reduces the 
range in which lower courts can cheat if they are so inclined. If lower courts 
deviate now, either the Justice to the left or to the right of the median will 
blow the whistle, and the lower court will get overturned on appeal. This 
keeps lower courts in line, as they recognize a higher probability that any 
cheating will be caught and overturned. 
If we think that the Court median is generally able to decide cases at her 
ideal policy, what she really wants from the lower courts is that they follow 
that policy. By turning over the agenda-setting power to the Justices on 
either side of her, she is able to get compliance from the lower courts. By 
handing over power at the agenda-setting stage, the median Justice gets to 
keep lower courts in line. Under this logic, the median benefits tremendously 
from the Rule of Four, and so she would not support its demise. 
This account is elegant and has the virtue of being about the only 
theoretical attempt to answer the intriguing question of why the Court 
majority continues to follow the Rule of Four. Nonetheless, there are a 
couple of empirical inconsistencies with the theory. First of all, the Justices
are generally clear that they do not view themselves as engaged in error 
correction. If the lower court “deviates” because the Court has been unclear, 
then the Justices will likely take the case to clarify the law, not to simply 
correct an error. If the law is clear and the lower courts still cheat, then the 
Court either ignores it, because the law is clear and the Court’s job is done, 
or it may simply reverse summarily. 
Another point to keep in mind is that in the early Rehnquist Court, Byron 
White was both the Court median and the most frequent advocate for taking 
more cases. For instance, in the several terms when Justice Kennedy was the 
junior Justice, Justice White voted to grant cert 486 times.167 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist came in second with 284 votes in favor of cert.168 One implication 
of Lax’s model is that ceteris paribus the median should be less likely to 
grant cert, but Justice White defies that prediction. Of course, all else is not 
likely equal. Justice White thought the Court should be deciding more cases, 
and he voted accordingly. But it appears Justice White did not need the Rule 
of Four to help him monitor cases.
F. The Anti-Filibuster
The preceding Section suggests that the Rule of Four gets the Court 
involved in cases of great importance even when the majority does not want 
to end up there. There is an interesting comparison here with the filibuster 
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rule in the Senate. The supermajority requirement in the Senate empowers 
the minority to keep certain proposals from coming up for consideration. It 
also has the effect of empowering the Senate as an institution. Without the 
filibuster, the Senate would likely devolve into a purely majoritarian 
institution like the House. Policy negotiations would only need to satisfy the 
median to clear a majority.  But with the filibuster in place, much if not most 
of the important legislative work hinges on getting through the Senate 
filibuster. This moderates policy, but it also enhances the Senate’s standing.
Just as the Senate filibuster raises that chamber’s profile, the Rule of 
Four promotes the Court. By keeping the Court engaged in a broader range 
of cases and by increasing the odds that the Court will find itself deciding 
matters of great public concern, the Rule keeps the Court at the front and 
center of public life. Of course, once in the game, the Justices have to play, 
and that is where questions about the relationship between ideological and 
jurisprudential preferences come to the fore.
III. AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF POLITICS IN THE CERTIORARI 
PROCESS
Certiorari is the narrow gateway to review, so naturally practitioners and 
academics have long been interested in what it takes to get the Court to take 
a case.169 Scholars have also been attuned to the substantive importance of 
certiorari as an institution.170 The ability to control the docket gives the Court 
the power to direct its “mere[] judgment” if it does not fully provide Force 
or Will.171 By choosing what issues it will place on its docket, it directly 
affects the political agenda for the nation.172 Equally important, by choosing 
                                                                                                                         
169 E.g., Caldeira & Wright, supra note 110, at 1109; Robert M. Lawless & Dylan Lager Murray, 
An Empirical Analysis of Bankruptcy Certiorari, 62 MO. L. REV. 101, 102–04 (1997); PERRY, supra note 
15, at 135–39; David C. Thompson and Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court 
Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor 
General, 16 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 237, 239 (2009).
170 E.g., Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William 
Howard Taft, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1363, 1366 (2006) (suggesting that “the reduced merits docket has 
exacerbated the shortcomings within the Rehnquist Court’s grant process of certiorari review, and has 
had a negative impact on its jurisprudence” and that “the ‘cert. pool’—the first level of review for any 
petition for certiorari—has become too powerful”); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, 
The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection,
82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 397 (2004) (“Given the many levels on which the Court’s case-selection 
decisions impact its work, its role, and its image, decisionmaking at the threshold stage may be second 
to none in importance.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
171 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 227 (Alexander Hamilton). But see Hartnett, supra note 5, at 1718 
(arguing that while Hamilton’s assertion is still widely quoted, it is “hardly an accurate description of a 
court that has the power to set its own agenda. . . . The ability to set one’s own agenda is at the heart of 
exercising will”).
172 See Warren E. Burger & Earl Warren, Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice 
Burger Defends Freund Study Group’s Composition and Proposal, 59 A.B.A. J. 721, 728 (1973) (noting 
that denials of certiorari can have a large impact on legal developments); see also Margaret Meriwether 
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which questions to avoid, the Court can sidestep landmines that might 
threaten its standing.173
Unfortunately, it is quite difficult to study certiorari using traditional 
tools of legal scholarship. The Court gives scholars little to work with when 
it comes to the cert process, and since the writ is discretionary, there is no 
legal right to cert to be understood, much less vindicated.174 The standard 
legal tools of careful explication of reasoned and public opinions are almost 
entirely unavailable to us because the Court does not explain its cert 
decisions. What guidance they do provide is largely provided in Rule 10, 
which offers a list of considerations that is “neither controlling nor fully 
measur[es] the Court’s discretion.”175 The remaining information we have 
from traditional legal sources comes largely from occasional dissents from 
denials of cert.176
Answers to substantive questions must therefore come from sources 
other than the U.S. Reports or Statutes at Large. Qualitatively, the Justices
have occasionally spoken individually about the cert process.177 H.W. Perry 
has a justifiably famous book based on interviews with Justices and clerks 
about the cert process.178 Quantitatively inclined scholars have undertaken 
large-scale data collection efforts to piece together the information available 
to the Justices at the cert stage, looking for clues as to what drives the 
decision.179
The aim of this Section is to study the cert process quantitatively to 
understand the Court more broadly. Cert is not so much the subject of 
inquiry as it is the lens through which one may examine the Court. Put 
differently, by viewing the cert process as a political process embedded in a 
judicial institution, we can learn a lot about the Court. 
This study requires a model of voting at the cert stage that assumes 
Justices participate in the agenda-setting round with a good understanding 
                                                                                                                         
Cordray & Richard Cordray, Setting the Social Agenda: Deciding to Review High-Profile Cases at the 
Supreme Court, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 313, 313 (2009) (arguing that the cases that the Supreme Court 
grants cert on have the ability to influence the public’s view on important issues).
173 KLOPPENBERG, supra note 21; Marshall, supra note 12; Hartnett, supra note 5, at 1648 (“[T]he 
legitimacy of judicial action is widely thought to be dependent on its conformity with law, yet there is 
(virtually) no law governing the Supreme Court’s exercise of power to set its own agenda, and the Court 
has steadfastly refused to establish any.”); Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice,
Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to 
Gibson, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 621, 622 (1991).
174 See Hartnett, supra note 5, at 1648 (nothing that the Supreme Court has discretion to grant 
certiorari).
175 SUP. CT. R. 10.
176 E.g., Singleton v. Comm’r, 439 U.S. 940, 940–42 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari); id. at 942 (Stevens, J., responding to Blackmun). 
177 See id. at 942–51 (providing Justice Stevens’s interpretation on granting of certiorari). 
178 PERRY, supra note 15.
179 See, e.g., Caldeira & Wright, supra note 110, at 1109–10 (discussing an “empirical” study “on 
the impact of amicus curiae participation” on the Court’s decisions “to grant writs of certiorari”).
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of both the current law and the likely consequences of taking the case. Thus, 
the model assumes Justices are strategic in the sense that they are able to 
look down the game tree and make educated guesses as to how the case will 
turn out.180 In comparison, the model allows Justices to be ideological; that 
is, they may act on ideological preferences. This Section uses the model to 
address three important questions about the Court. First, it quantifies how 
much of what the Justices do—at least at the cert stage—is about ideology 
and how much is about the commonly recognized Rule 10 factors. Second, 
it provides evidence that stable ideological minorities are able to wield 
disproportionate influence at the cert stage. Finally, it suggests a previously 
overlooked power of the Chief Justice at the agenda-setting stage. But first, 
to motivate this empirical exploration, the Section begins with a brief 
description of the research model.
A. A Brief Description of the Model and Estimation Strategy
Studying the cert votes allows a greater understanding of the Court. This 
Section presents two novel findings that result from a relatively simple 
model. The model used is closely related to the models used to understand 
Justices’ votes at disposition. Perhaps the most well known of these models 
is that of Professors Martin and Quinn,181 which is widely used in the law 
and social-science literatures.182 They look at how Justices vote when 
deciding to reverse or affirm a decision on the merits and use that 
information to derive “ideal points” for each Justice.
As certiorari is a different process, the standard model must be adapted 
to take the contours of the cert process seriously.183 The model presented 
here accounts for Join-3 votes, different Justices’ preferences regarding 
taking cases, and different Justices’ comfort with using the Join-3 as a tool. 
                                                                                                                         
180 See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Strategy in Supreme Court Case 
Selection: The Relationship Between Certiorari and the Merits, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 29 (2008) (“[T]here 
is a significant merits-oriented component in the Justices’ decisionmaking on certiorari.”).
181 Martin & Quinn, supra note 25, at 135.
182 E.g., Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. 
L. REV. 1275, 1279 (2005); Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of 
Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1353–54 (2009); Matthew 
Sag, Tonja Jacobi & Maxim Sytch, Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property: An Empirical 
Study, 97 CAL. L. REV. 801, 820–21 (2009); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a 
Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1746 (2010).
183 From a technical perspective, my model makes only minor adjustments to standard models in 
the literature. While these models appear at first glance to be so-much statistical wizardry, they are 
well-known in the literature and quite valuable to scholars. See, e.g., Joshua B. Fischman, Do the Justices 
Vote Like Policy Makers? Evidence from Scaling the Supreme Court with Interest Groups, 44 J. LEGAL 
STUD. S269, S274 (2015); Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 69, 104 (2010); see also Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes: 
Misconceptions, Measurement, and Models, 98 CAL. L. REV. 813, 833–34 (2010) (noting that by using 
data on merits votes, Professors Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, and Lee Epstein were able to 
calculate the probability that each Justice was the median member of the Court).
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It also accounts for the Court’s stated preference for bringing clarity to the 
law. Cases where the Court can bring clarity to the law will reduce the 
variance in lower court outcomes, and Justices derive utility from reducing 
this variance. 
There are several benefits to using cert votes as opposed to the Justices’ 
decisions on the merits. First, there are many more votes at the 
agenda-setting stage than at the merits stage. There are usually two to three 
times as many cases with recorded cert votes as there are cases decided on 
the merits. Second, because the Justices choose which cases they take but do 
not get to choose which petitions are filed, there is less concern that results 
are biased by their selectivity. These advantages lead to ideal point estimates 
that are far more stable than those recovered from merits votes. The model 
also returns other interesting quantities including measures of Justices’ 
individual preferences for taking lots of cases, the expected ideological shift 
in the law from taking the case, and even a rough measure of case 
importance. The model may also easily be adapted to take into account 
different covariates of interest, for example, whether the petition is a civil 
case, comes from a federal court, is a capital case, etcetera.
The model is more fully presented in the accompanying technical 
appendix. But, in brief, the assumption is that Justices and policies can be 
placed in a single left-right dimension. A liberal policy is to the left of a 
conservative policy, and a liberal, like Justice Brennan, is to the left of a 
conservative, like Chief Justice Rehnquist.184 Justices have an idea of where 
the current law is on this line, and they have an idea of where the law will 
end up if the Court takes the case.185 The ideological calculation the Justices
make depends in part on whether the new policy would be closer to them 
than the old one.186
The model assumes that Justices would like to vote to grant cert for 
important cases, cases that clarify the law, and cases that move the law in 
their preferred ideological direction.187 Cases that are not important, will not 
do much to improve doctrinal clarity, or will move the law away from a 
Justice’s preferred rule should not receive a vote for cert. In addition, as 
Justices implicitly compare the reasons for and against voting to grant cert, 
                                                                                                                         
184 Ho and Quinn argue that while this spatial framework is helpful to motivate the model, it is not 
strictly necessary to justify the statistical enterprise. See Ho & Quinn, supra note 186, at 819 (noting that 
“measurement models can be illuminating even if the spatial theory is questionable”). 
185 See infra Technical Appendix. Strictly speaking, all that is required is that Justices share a 
common belief about the distribution of the rules that lower courts currently apply and the distribution 
lower courts will apply if the Court takes the case. By framing the model in terms of the distribution of 
possible policies instead of the single policy, it is possible to treat the variance of the likely applications 
as a measure of the law’s clarity. When there is a circuit split and the law is unclear, there is a high 
variance in the current application. If the Court could decide the case in such a way that this variance 
would be reduced, this would create a reason for every Justice to take the case.
186 Id.
187 See PERRY, supra note 15, at 217, 253–54.
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Justices must also consider how many cases they would like to take overall, 
with some Justices preferring to take more cases than others.188 Accordingly, 
different Justices will need the positive factors to outweigh the reasons to 
deny cert by more than other Justices. Once the benefits reach that 
Justice-specific critical level, the Justice will at least vote Join-3. If the 
reasons to grant are strong enough, that Join-3 will turn into a full vote to 
grant.189 In this way, the model follows Perry’s guidance that the Join-3 is a 
timid grant.190
This model has three types of variables. The first type of variables are 
case-specific, including information drawn from the memos, a term to 
capture191 general case importance,192 and the (possibly negative) distance 
between where the law is and where they expect it to be if they grant cert.193
If the distance is positive, then the law is expected to move to the right 
(become more conservative than the current doctrine).194 Likewise, if the 
distance is negative, this signals the law is expected to move to the left. If 
the distance is close to zero, then the Court does not expect doctrine to 
become much more conservative or liberal, as it will not move far at all.
The second type of variables are Justice specific. The first of these is 
each Justice’s ideal point. This is directly analogous to ideal points measured 
by Martin and Quinn.195 These ideal points are often viewed as a measure of 
the conservatism or liberalism of a Justice’s jurisprudence or ideology.196
Second, a Justice-specific parameter sets the individual Justice’s floor for 
                                                                                                                         
188 Kenneth W. Moffett, Forrest Maltzman, Karen Miranda & Charles R. Shipan, Strategic Behavior 
and Variation in the Supreme Court’s Caseload over Time, 37 JUST. SYS. J. 20, 20 (2016).
189 See PERRY, supra note 15, at 168.
190 Id. at 167–68.
191 The case importance term measures the commonly recognized level of importance. Rather than 
assuming that all circuit splits, for example, create a fixed level of importance, the model has the 
flexibility to recover the common level of importance recognized by all Justices for a given case. Justices 
can think some splits are more important than others, that some recommendations from the SG are more 
urgent, etc. The case importance term backs out the level of importance common to all Justices regardless 
of the factors.
192 It is important to distinguish between a case that is important ex-ante and a case that becomes 
important ex-post. Take the earlier Free Exercise example of Smith. See discussion supra Part I. When it 
appeared, the case was not intrinsically important. It subsequently became a very important precedent 
because of the law the Court made. At cert, case importance is about the ex-ante importance, which is 
independent of the legacy the case may create.
193 See infra Technical Appendix. This is actually the expected value of a draw from the distribution 
of policies that will follow either denying or granting cert. The variance of these distributions captures 
the clarity or lack thereof in the law and is captured in the case importance term.
194 Ho & Quinn, supra note 186, at 827.
195 Martin & Quinn, supra note 184, at 135.
196 Ho & Quinn, supra note 186, at 836–37. Ho and Quinn appropriately point out that the best 
understanding of this parameter is “a descriptive summary of the single dimension that best characterizes 
differences in” the Justices’ votes. Id. The measures correspond to the familiar left-right spectrum, but 
this does not necessarily imply that “the scale accords with a coherent political philosophy or pure policy 
preferences untethered from law.” Id.
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voting Join-3.197 If a Justice requires a greater “payoff” to take a case, then 
she will vote to take fewer cases than other Justices, holding all else equal. 
The final Justice-specific parameter is the threshold at which the Justice
moves from Join-3 to a full grant.
The last terms are specific to individual Justices in a specific case.198
The first of these is a random shock. I assume that these shocks are normally 
distributed with a mean of zero, so that in expectation, the shock should not 
change any Justice’s vote in any case. The second such term is each Justice’s 
net return from taking the case. This net return is calculated by combining 
the Justice-specific terms with the case-specific terms and adding the 
random shock.199 If this return is higher than the Justice’s grant threshold 
(the third Justice-specific term), she votes to grant. If this return is between 
the two threshold values for the Justice, she casts a Join-3. If it is less than 
the Join-3 threshold (the second Justice-specific value), she votes to deny.
The estimation procedure is relatively straightforward. It starts by 
randomly filling in values for each of the case- and Justice-specific 
parameters.200 The next step is to look at the actual vote and use that 
information to draw the error term. Since there is a Justice-specific constant, 
the assumption is that a Justice would vote to deny cert if her net return is 
less than zero. The computer draws a random error term subject to the 
constraint that, when included with the Justice- and case-specific terms, 
results in negative net utility. It then uses the new error term and the 
case-specific parameters to estimate new values for the Justice-specific 
parameters. Having done that, it uses the net utility and just-found 
Justice-specific terms to estimate case-specific terms. The program moves 
in a loop, holding the two terms constant and using them to find the third. 
The loop cycles thousands of times and stores these values. At the end of the 
run, the average values are computed, and those are the numbers given in 
the following analysis.
B. The Effect of Ideology on the Docket
While political scientists generally use such models to measure 
ideology, a substantively more important question is whether that ideology 
affects the Court’s docket. Fortunately, the cert model provides tools to 
begin answering this question. The gap parameter provides an estimate for 
the expected change in policy along an ideological dimension.201 Using these 
                                                                                                                         
197 See infra Technical Appendix.
198 Id. at Model 1.
199 Id. at 65.
200 Id. at 59.
201 One of the things to keep in mind about these models is that the distances are not well identified. 
But they do give a relative notion of distance, and the direction is identified once Rehnquist is fixed on 
the right and Brennan on the left. What this means is that if the estimated model returns a +2 for one case 
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estimates, it is straightforward to compare the cases in which the Court 
granted cert with those in which it denied the writ. If the docket is not 
influenced by ideology, then the gap parameters—which measure the 
expected change in the law if the Court grants cert—should look similar. 
Thinking in terms of probability distributions, we would anticipate that the 
ideological distribution of granted cases should match the ideological 
distribution of denied cases. And yet when those two distributions are 
compared in Figure 1, they do not match.202
Figure 1 shows the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of 
the gap parameters for the subset of cases where the Court granted cert and 
the subset where the Court denied certiorari. The plus-signs represent 
expected shifts of cases the Court granted. Notice that for cases further to 
the left, for example, those less than -0.5 or so, the plus-signs are well to the 
right of the simple dots, which represent the cases the clerks recommended 
granting. That indicates that the Court took relatively few cases expected to 
move the law to the left. In the middle of the graph—near zero—the 
plus-signs catch up quickly. That indicates that the Court took a lot of cases 
where importance, not ideology, was the most important factor. Finally, 
looking further to the right of the figure, the plus-signs are again to the right 
of the dots. That signals that the conservatives were able to take relatively 
more ideologically conservative cases. In sum, the conservatives on the 
Court were generally effective at putting cases on the docket that would 
maximize a conservative shift in the law.
                                                                                                                         
and a -1 for another, we can say that the first case is expected to move the law in a conservative direction 
and that change should be larger than the expected liberal change in the law for the second case.
202 See infra Figure 3. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test returns a p-value of 0.0025. Thus, we can 
confidently reject the hypothesis that the distributions are the same.
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Figure 1: Set of Granted Cases Are Ideologically Different than Denied 
Cases
But the story is a bit more complex than this. The comparison between 
the granted and denied cases clearly demonstrates that the cases that make 
the docket are expected to end up with more conservative outcomes than the 
ones that do not make it through certiorari. But another interesting 
comparison is between the cases that make the docket and the cases that 
“should” make the docket based only on importance. This is a tougher test 
to run because it requires generating a set of cases that the Court “should” 
take. Fortunately, the cert pool memos are available to serve as a worthy 
proxy. 
Recall that the clerks who write the memos are instructed to provide a 
recommendation as to whether the Court should grant the petition. Further, 
the memo and recommendation are supposed to be free of clerks’ own 
ideological biases. Of course, this is not to say that clerks never fudge on the 
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recommendation to promote or protect ideological considerations. It is only 
to say that the institutional pressures are against such behavior. Further, there 
is no reason to think that conservative or liberal clerks are any more or less 
likely to shade the truth. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to use the set of 
cases where clerks recommended granting cert as a proxy for the distribution 
of cases important enough to grant cert.
Figure 2 below shows the ideological distribution of the cases where the 
clerks recommended a grant in gray and the ideological distribution of cases 
the Court actually granted in black.203 The bars represent the proportion of 
total recommendations and actual grants that would move the law 
significantly to the left, the right, or not much at all.204 If the clerks’ 
recommendations are representative of the breakdown of the “important” 
cases, it appears that the liberal bloc is getting more cases onto the docket 
than it “should.” 
Figure 2: Liberal Minority Gets Extra Cases
                                                                                                                         
203 The data is drawn from the 1988 term.
204 Gap parameters less than -1 are considered liberal moves, parameters greater than 1 are 
conservative moves, and parameters that suggest policy would move less than one unit in either direction 
were classified as no/small shift.
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These two different comparisons lead to the following conclusions about 
the effect of ideology on the cert process. First, conservatives know that they 
are likely to win on the merits, and they prefer to take and win important 
cases. Doing so means trying to keep less important cases or those where 
there will not be a sufficiently large conservative shift in the law off of the 
docket. Second, they are usually successful at this, but in a nontrivial number 
of cases, the liberal minority is able to identify cases they—but not the 
conservative majority—want to put on the docket. They do not get as many 
of these cases as they would like, but they get more than they “should” 
compared to the clerk recommendations. In short, conservatives are able to 
use certiorari to identify important cases that will let them move the law to 
the right, but liberals are able to use the Rule of Four to add additional cases 
of their choosing.
These empirical observations align with some of the strategies suggested 
above. Liberal coalitions on the conservative Rehnquist Court were able to 
use the Rule of Four to push additional cases onto the docket, consistent with 
the various minority-enhancing strategies above. Similarly, the evidence 
suggests that the set of cases the Court actually grants are likely to yield 
more conservative outcomes than the cases it rejects. This suggests the 
conservative majority targeted cases to promote their policy preferences.
C. The Chief Justice Really Matters
Another aspect available through the cert votes is a chance to examine 
the importance of the Chief Justice. The Chief has several tools that 
empower him to shape the law. The foremost is the power to assign 
opinions.205 But the Chief has two particular opportunities to affect the 
development of law through the case selection process. The first tool is the 
Discuss List. The Chief is responsible for circulating the first draft of the 
list, and so he is able to ensure that his preferred cases are considered.206
However, this particular first-mover advantage is not all that strong on its 
own as any Justice can add a case to the Discuss List.207 The Chief cannot 
prevent a case from being discussed, and he has no more power than any 
other Justice to add a case.
The second possible advantage the Chief has is another first-mover 
advantage: the privilege of voting first.208 Since Justices have little time to 
analyze each petition,209 they may not have very fixed opinions on the 
                                                                                                                         
205 Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the US Supreme 
Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 276, 276 (2007).
206 PERRY, supra note 15, at 85.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 86.
209 See Hart, supra note 98, at 88 (discussing the limited time that a Justice has to analyze petitions); 
McElwain, supra note 98, at 14 (same).
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importance of a case.210 In such a situation, the institutional practice of 
voting sequentially instead of simultaneously presents an opportunity for 
Justices to learn about the case based on the votes of others. Justices vote in 
order of seniority, so in the data, Chief Justice Rehnquist usually voted
first.211 As such, other Justices could take cues from his vote. Of course, if a 
Justice did not share the Chief’s views on what made a case certworthy, or 
believed the Chief’s vote was a poor signal of quality in general, she may 
have thought the signal was uninformative and ignored it. 
The challenge in looking for the first-mover advantage is distinguishing 
between signaling and shared ideology. If conservatives would like to have
taken a case, then Rehnquist should have voted to take the case, as should 
the other conservatives. Their votes should have been correlated simply 
because they shared a common ideology. 
One can separate out the effect of ideology by controlling for it through 
treating Rehnquist’s votes as data. Begin by coding a Rehnquist vote in favor 
of cert (including a Join-3) as 1 and a vote to deny a petition as -1. Then, 
include that variable as data in the cert model and estimate as before. The 
estimation procedure will return a different coefficient for each Justice,
which measures the effect of the Chief’s vote. This measures the effect 
associated with Rehnquist’s vote while still controlling for ideology.212 To 
capture the effect of the Chief’s vote, I first count how many votes the full 
model—including the Chief’s vote—correctly predicts. I then subtract the 
effect of the Chief’s vote from the underlying net utility and predict the votes 
again. The difference in the number of correct predictions is the predicted 
effect of the Chief’s vote.213
The data show the correlation from Rehnquist’s vote affects roughly 7
percent of other Justices’ cert votes. As Figure 5 shows, the effect is positive 
and significant for five of the eight Justices. For Justices O’Connor and 
Kennedy, the effect is quite substantial; the effect associated with 
Rehnquist’s votes was large enough to change 16 percent of their votes. 
                                                                                                                         
210 But see PERRY, supra note 15, at 86 (explaining that Justices may put a case on the discussion 
list without having a strong opinion about it).
211 The exceptions are in cases added to the list by another Justice, in which that Justice would lead 
off the discussion. Id.
212 I coded votes to grant and Join-3 as 1, votes to decline as 0, and dropped all cases where 
Rehnquist did not vote. It is important to note that the causal effect is not strictly identified here, as I 
cannot randomize the Chief Justice. Still, the correlation is consistent with a model of other Justices 
learning from the Chief’s vote.
213 This is a conservative measure of the effect. The test is based on the counterfactual scenario 
where the Chief does not vote, rather than where the Chief voted in the opposite direction. For instance, 
suppose for a given Justice that the coefficient on the Chief Justice’s vote was 2. Then, if Rehnquist voted 
to grant cert, that other Justice would add 2 to the underlying net utility, and would be more likely to vote 
for cert. If he does not observe the Chief’s vote, then the additional two units go away. But if Rehnquist 
had voted to deny, instead of adding 2 to the underlying measure of utility, one would subtract 2. This 
would be a swing of four units, not two. If one were to run the test switching Rehnquist’s votes from 
grant to deny and from deny to grant, then the effects would be even larger.
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Rehnquist’s vote pushed O’Connor and Kennedy to change their votes for 
about forty-five petitions in 1989 alone. 
Justice Blackmun was also more likely to vote for cert if Rehnquist did. 
While Blackmun was not as far to the left as Justices Brennan or Marshall, 
he was hardly a regular member of the conservative majority on the Court.214
Blackmun’s greater likelihood to follow the Chief at cert indicates that 
Rehnquist’s vote is signaling something to Blackmun about the 
certworthiness of the case.
                                                                                                                         
214 See Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley, Assessing the Conservatism of the Rehnquist 
Court, 77 JUDICATURE 83, 86, 88 (1993) (describing Blackmun’s transformation from a “consistently 
conservative” Justice into “one of the most liberal Justices on the Rehnquist court”).
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Figure 3:Effects of Rehnquist’s Vote on Five of the Other Eight Justices
It is important to note that since Rehnquist’s votes were not random, 
these estimates are not strictly causal. While the sequence of votes makes it 
impossible for O’Connor’s vote to have influenced Rehnquist’s vote, it is 
still possible that some unmodeled and nonideological third factor explains 
the correlation between these votes. Still, given the large literature on 
sequential voting and first-mover effects,215 the results are consistent with 
theories that would suggest the Chief has a strong influence on the docket 
by moving first. This is strong—but still only suggestive—evidence that the 
Chief has significant influence over the Court’s docket. This effect deserves 
further study, especially because the Chief also votes first at disposition.216
If the first-mover advantage remains when the Court decides the case, or 
                                                                                                                         
215 See, e.g., Marco Ottaviani & Peter Sørensen, Information Aggregation in Debate: Who Should 
Speak First?, 81 J. PUB. ECON. 393, 395–96 (2001) (examining the importance of the sequence in which 
heterogeneous experts convey information); Jan Potters, Martin Sefton & Lise Vesterlund, After You—
Endogenous Sequencing in Voluntary Contribution Games, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1399, 1400 (2005) 
(studying the effects of the sequence of contributions and level of information on donors’ contributions 
to a public good). 
216 Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Passing and Strategic Voting on 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 L. & SOC’Y REV. 349, 350 (2005).
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when the assigned Justice circulates the draft opinion, then sequencing 
effects would have a powerful effect on law. 
For the purposes of this Article, it is enough to show that there is a high 
likelihood that the Chief influences the docket. As we have seen previously, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s own votes were highly affected by ideology.217 If 
the Chief’s first-mover advantage is real, then Rehnquist’s ideology has an 
outsized influence on the Court, which may help explain why the Court took 
cases that pushed the law in Rehnquist’s preferred direction. Giving this sort 
of power to the Chief seems normatively problematic, so the Article 
proposes a change to the voting procedures that would reduce this monopoly 
power.218
These results challenge the qualitative conclusions provided by Perry.219
To be sure, Perry’s initial thought was that the sequence would affect votes, 
but he was repeatedly assured that it did not.220 There are several possible 
explanations for the discrepancy between Perry’s initial hypothesis and the 
results presented here on the one hand and the accounts provided by the 
Justices to Perry on the other. First, as Perry recounts, there was not a great 
deal of respect for Chief Justice Burger on the Court.221 It is possible that 
Chief Justice Burger did not influence the votes of other Justices and those 
Justices were correct in their self-assessments. The results presented here 
come from the Rehnquist Court, and Rehnquist may have commanded 
greater respect and wielded greater influence than Burger. Second, the 
largest effects are concentrated among the newest Justices.222 It may be that 
the effect dissipates over time. If so, the Chief may occasionally be able to 
influence the votes of other Justices, but the effect is small enough that the 
other Justices do not recount it in interviews.
IV. POLITICS IN CERTIORARI: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
So far, this Article has established the empirical reality of politics at play 
in the cert process and worked through the possible strategies available to 
the Justices under the Rule of Four. Essentially, it is now empirically clear 
that the Justices are playing at politics and theoretically clear how they play. 
At which point, there are two distinct questions remaining. First, what are 
the potential consequences of politicizing the Court’s discretionary 
jurisdiction and second, what if anything could be done about it? 
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A. Threats to the Court’s Legitimacy
As the Court becomes perceived as a policy-making body with political 
preferences,223 its legitimacy is increasingly called into question.224 Work in 
political psychology shows that citizens have a strong negative response to 
Court decisions portrayed as politically motivated, compared to decisions 
described as following legal guidelines.225 Similarly, respondents had a 
lower view of the Court’s legitimacy when exposed to articles describing 
Chief Justice Roberts’ decision in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius226 as a political decision to strategically flip his vote.227
As shown above, the Court’s certiorari decisions have led to a situation 
where the merits docket is far more ideologically fraught than the certiorari 
docket. By focusing its attention on these more polarizing cases, the Court 
feeds the perception that its decisions are almost entirely ideological. If the 
Court were deciding 350 cases a term that were more representative of the 
certiorari docket, it is likely their decisions would appear far less ideological. 
Instead, the Court has reduced its workload and concentrated on the most 
divisive cases. This both undermines public support in the Court and means 
that the Justices are leaving large fields of doctrine largely untended.
Threats to legitimacy exist outside of politics as well. At the conceptual 
level, the politicization of the cert process further erodes the foundations of 
judicial review. Consider Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury.
Marshall asserted that the Court had the power of judicial review because 
“[t]hose who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound 
and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must 
decide on the operation of each.”228 Judicial review hinges on the Court’s 
obligation—“of necessity” and “must decide”—to decide the question.229
Marshall was even more clear in Cohens v. Virginia:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it 
should not: but it is equally true, that it must take 
jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the 
legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the 
confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by because it 
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is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever 
difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it 
be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the 
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that 
which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to
the constitution. Questions may occur which we would 
gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, 
to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to 
perform our duty.230
On this traditional account, the Court’s power of judicial review is 
incidental to its power to decide cases.231 Put differently, the Court’s 
substantive power flows from its procedural obligations to decide cases. And 
yet, the Court today has no such obligation. As Professor Hartnett has noted: 
“A court that can simply refuse to hear a case can no longer credibly say that 
it had to decide it.”232
When the Court gained control over its docket, it promised to avoid this 
problem by taking cases “according to recognized principles.”233 For 
instance, it promised Congress that it would take any case involving a circuit 
split “as a matter of course,”234 as well as any “constitutional question of any 
real merit or doubt.”235 The Court also promised that the lower courts could 
certify questions to the Supreme Court, thereby “plac[ing] the question of 
review also in the discretion of the Circuit Court of Appeals.”236 In essence, 
Congress initially gave the Court discretion on the promise that the Court 
would follow “recognized principles” that would involve the Court in 
essentially every nonfrivolous case.237
While it soon became clear the Court was applying a stricter standard of 
importance than mere nonfrivolousness, commenters remained convinced 
that the Court avoided danger by having “defined standards for the exercise 
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of its discretion.”238 Herbert Wechsler urged that “[o]nly the maintenance 
and the improvement of such standards and, of course, their faithful 
application can . . . protect the Court against the danger of the imputation of 
bias . . . .”239
Neutral principles seemed to offer a way to hold off the challenge to the 
Court’s judicial review power. By adhering to these objective standards, the 
Court would be obligated to decide cases that meet objective criteria. With 
obligation still in play, the judicial review power is maintained. Even so, it 
is a bit unsettling that these criteria were established by the Court. 
Accordingly, Wechsler urged Congress to play a more active role and to be 
more specific about what types of cases the Court should take.240 This would 
further remove politics and discretion from the Court and safeguard judicial 
review within the confines of obligation.
Instead, Congress has moved in the other direction, removing almost all 
mandatory jurisdiction and leaving the docket almost entirely to the 
discretion of the Court even as the Court has refused to clarify its own 
standards. The result is “a plenary docket reflecting the particular agenda of 
shifting coalitions of four or more justices”241 instead of a docket composed 
of cases that meet objective criteria.
The absence of such criteria leaves the Court unprotected “against the 
danger of the imputation of bias.”242 What is more, as seen in Part II, bias is 
clearly present. What is more disturbing is that the particular bias Wechsler 
was concerned about when discussing the Court’s agenda setting was bias 
for or against certain kinds of claims. He cites a law review note that showed 
the Court was taking an unjustifiable number of claims under FELA. 243 The 
present Article shows that the Court is directly biased for or against different 
ideological outcomes. At cert, politics operates at a much more ideological 
level than Wechsler imagined. 
In sum, the lack of clear standards for managing the discretionary docket 
opens up the Court to attack. In the absence of standards, the Justices often 
pursue ideological aims through the cert process. This is particularly 
problematic because it leads the Court to take cases it should not and to not 
take cases it should, which violates the constitutional covenant that 
empowers the Court to state what the law is. This problem is exacerbated 
because the Court now focuses on the questions that let Justices implement 
their political views. As such, it is not clear that the current Court is making 
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legitimate use of the judicial power, and it is substituting Will, if not exactly 
Force, for Judgment.244
B. Proposals to Channel or Relocate Political Power in Certiorari
Supposing ideological decision making and large agenda-setting power 
by the Chief are problematic, what can be done about these features of the 
current process? At the outset, it must be admitted any change is unlikely. 
The current process represents the decades-long and successful attempt by 
the Court to control and reduce its docket. It is unlikely to sit passively in 
the face of attempts to temper this control. To the extent Congress has shown 
interest in making use of its Article III powers, it usually works in the 
direction of removing cases from the Court’s jurisdiction rather than 
imposing pressure to increase transparency and neutrality in the cert 
process.245 Insofar as the Justices have no incentive to change things and 
Congress has no interest in forcing the issue, the success of any particular 
proposal is doubtful. Still, reforms could take one of two paths. First, the 
Court or Congress could pursue strategies to reform the substance of 
certiorari rules. In the alternative, they could reform the process through 
which the Court takes cases.
1. Clarify the Rules
A common refrain in the effort to improve certiorari is the request for 
greater clarity. Scholars have again and again called on Congress or the 
Court to promulgate improved standards that would provide clear guidance 
for applicants. Such clarification should provide several benefits. First, by 
being more explicit about the standards, the Court should face fewer 
frivolous petitions, as parties in some cases would be able to read the rules 
and realize the Court will not take their respective cases. Second, by 
following clearer statements, the certiorari process would appear a more 
legitimate use of judicial discretion. Clear rules would seem to make 
certiorari both more efficient and more legitimate.
To succeed, the standards must be sufficiently clear and the Court 
committed enough to them that the new regime would significantly reduce
the Court’s discretion over the docket. If the Court is still willing and able 
to go beyond the standards, parties will still take their chances with a cert 
petition—lowering the efficiency gains—and the Court would still be 
perceived as exercising unbounded—instead of judicial—discretion, 
limiting any legitimating upside. 
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The challenge is to create and maintain such standards. To see the 
difficulty in writing down such standards, consider the proposal by Samuel 
Estreicher and John E. Sexton. They would divide cases into those the Court 
should take (the Priority Docket), those the Court could take if it wanted (the 
Discretionary Docket), and those the Court should not take (Improvident 
Grants).246 The first of these categories would include cases where there are 
“intolerable” splits in lower courts, blatant conflicts with Supreme Court 
precedent, profound threats to federalism or the separation of powers, 
interstate disputes, and those where either state courts strike a federal action 
as unconstitutional or where the federal court strikes a state action. The 
second set covers those cases where there is: reason to be suspicious of the 
lower court when reviewing a federal question, a pressing case involving 
vertical federalism disputes, interference with Executive authority, need for 
the Court’s extraordinary powers of supervision, a national emergency, an 
opportunity to advance the development of federal law, an appeal from a 
court of exclusive jurisdiction, or a need to apply clear precedent in cases 
where the effects could cause dramatic effects or “dislocation[s].”247 Even 
with these standards, there is clearly much room left for discretion. Whether 
a split is truly “intolerable,” for example, will always be a judgment call. 
Similarly, whether a federalism case is profound, pressing, or mundane is 
hard to define with any certainty. These—or any comparable set—of 
standards can hardly decide all cases clearly. That said, they would provide 
a marked improvement from the current guidelines; to recognize that 
benefits would be limited is not to say they would not be meaningful.
This leads to the second problem with calls to improve the standards: 
the Court may think trading away its vast discretion is too high a cost. As it 
stands, the Court takes the cases it wants with very little risk of pushback, 
largely because few people pay serious attention to certiorari decisions. 
Promulgating new guidelines would draw unwelcome attention to the cert 
stage. The Justices may feel pressure to take a case they would rather skip 
simply because it conforms to the standard. Similarly, the Justices may want 
to take a case that falls outside of newly announced parameters. Either way, 
the Court would lose some control over its docket. 
In return for this loss of control, it may get fewer petitions to work 
through, which would save it some time and may boost the Court’s 
legitimacy. However, as the Court has continued to reduce its caseload, the 
time constraints bite less. What is more, if the new guidelines resulted in 
piling additional cases onto the docket, the Justices would only be adding 
more work to their schedule, not reducing their burdens. Further, drawing 
attention to the docket might invite scrutiny and criticism rather than 
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applause. For the Justices, clarifying the rules of certiorari appears to come 
at too high a cost.
2. Increased Transparency
There have been occasional calls for the Court to explain its certiorari 
decisions.248 The benefits of this proposal are, again, improved efficiency—
as the bar learns what is or is not certworthy—and enhanced legitimacy. The 
mechanism is the same as before: clarity. One of the problems with clarified 
rules or standards is that it is very hard to write down standards that are not 
over- or underinclusive. This is a familiar problem to legal systems in 
general. The common-law system addresses this problem by developing 
case law. If the Court explained its decisions, it would develop a case law 
for certiorari that lawyers could learn from as they do in any other body of 
law. Further, the development of certiorari case law would signal that the 
Court’s decision is judicial in nature. The opinions would show how the 
Court grapples with its standards, and lawyers would be able to make 
arguments that address the Court’s real concerns.
And yet one might be reasonably concerned that written orders denying 
certiorari that were more than cursory could work mischief. The Court 
would have to be very careful to avoid opining on the issues or facts 
presented in the underlying litigation in a way that would affect future cases 
on the merits. But it would be very hard for the Court to issue useful opinions 
without engaging with the facts and issues of the instant case. The Court 
would likely either say too much about the issues—possibly unintentionally 
creating a strange type of precedent—or too little, which would mean that 
the opinions would not provide enough information to future litigants.
Of course, such a concern would likely never arise in practice because,
given the thousands of petitions the Court reviews each term, the 
requirement to explain the reasons why individual cases were rejected would 
overwhelm the Court.249 Almost certainly, the Court would fall back on 
summary opinions. The model here would be the traditional mandatory 
jurisdiction where appeals that appeared to satisfy the formal jurisdictional 
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requirements were dismissed “for lack of a substantive federal question.”250
Requiring a written opinion would invite similarly cursory and unhelpful
opinions, substantially eliminating any hope for a viable case law of 
certiorari.
Another proposal to increase transparency is to release the Justices’ 
certiorari votes.251 From the perspective of a party petitioning the Court, it 
would be useful to know which Justices have supported or opposed certiorari 
in similar cases. Just as litigants target pivotal Justices on the merits, it would 
be helpful to know which Justices will make or break a certiorari decision. 
From the perspective of policy, releasing the votes would increase 
legitimacy by promoting transparency and accountability. While per curiam 
decisions are not uncommon, judicial decisions at all levels are signed. By 
putting their names to their decisions, Justices publicly take responsibility 
for their decisions. Since certiorari is an especially political decision—as it 
is largely unconstrained by law, involves prioritizing competing policy 
interests, and the Court issues no written opinions—accountability is 
especially important.
This is a sensible suggestion with only manageable drawbacks. There 
are real concerns that releasing the votes too quickly could adversely 
influence ongoing litigation or add fuel to any fires lit in response to an 
unpopular decision. Accordingly, the Court could release the certiorari votes 
within a reasonable window of time—say, three years—after the end of the 
underlying litigation. This window allows the Court to benefit from 
increased transparency regarding cases that are still relevant without the risk 
of tipping the Court’s hand in any litigation that is still ongoing in the lower 
courts. Still, the Court is likely to push back against this proposal since it 
would be “inconsistent with the long-standing and desirable custom of not 
announcing the Conference vote on petitions for certiorari.”252
3. Changes to Voting Procedures
As detailed above, there are two particular voting procedures during 
certiorari that are important. First, the Rule of Four sets the threshold that 
separates the petitions that are dismissed from those that are granted. There 
have occasionally been suggestions that the Court change the voting rule. 
Justice Stevens, for instance, suggested turning the Rule of Four into a Rule 
of Five,253 thereby applying the same majority rule at the certiorari stage and 
at disposition. Enlarging the size of the minimal certiorari coalition would 
presumably help the Court avoid taking cases that it should not. In general, 
if one assumes that the more important the case the more likely each Justice
is to vote for certiorari, then petitions that garner four votes should, in 
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expectation, be the least important cases and, presumably, the ones most 
likely to turn out to be a waste of the Court’s time. With a minority-voting 
rule, it is easier for marginally important cases to sneak onto the docket, 
either because a few Justices misread the importance of the case, or because 
a minority is stuffing the docket. Either way, requiring an additional vote to 
grant certiorari would presumably filter out those cases the Court should not 
take.
But moving to a majority rule is not an unalloyed good. Moving to a 
majority rule at the agenda-setting stage would limit a minority coalition’s 
ability to mitigate the ideological impact of the majority. Moving to a 
majority rule makes it possible for the ideological majority to hold out for 
only those cases that provide large ideological payoffs. The run-of-the-mill 
cases where the Court is unanimous but the results do not promote the 
majority’s ideological ends will have a hard time getting the Court’s
attention. If these are cases that are important for law on the ground, forgoing 
them in favor of ideological wins would likely lead to bad public policy. 
Moving to a majority rule would also make it easier for lower courts to 
deviate from Court precedent. Recall that under Lax’s model, the Rule of 
Four254 allows the four liberal Justices255 to monitor conservative lower 
courts and punish deviations. Similarly, the four more conservative members 
police liberal lower courts. The median would tolerate some deviations 
because taking cases is costly, but the more extreme members are willing to 
pay these costs. The Rule of Four creates a credible threat of overturning 
lower courts which stray from the median’s preferred policy. 
Further, increasing the size of the minimum cert coalition will reduce 
the Court’s caseload even more.256 Along these same lines, it would 
dramatically increase the power of the median Justice. Moving to a Rule of 
Five would not make the Court less political; it would just mean the Court 
largely represents the politics of the median Justice. If Lax’s model is 
correct,257 lower courts could take advantage of this by deviating from Court 
precedent in ways that would not draw the median’s attention.
Finally, increasing the size of the necessary coalition would almost 
certainly reduce the size of the docket further while increasing the share of 
divisive 5-4 cases. The Court is already taking an incredibly small—and 
shrinking—number of cases.258 This has drawn the ire of many observers, 
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and, over time, threatens the ability of the Court to play an active role in the 
full scope of American law. Further, if the majority is holding out for big 
ideological wins, we should expect them to pick cases that will split the 
Court. Since the minority would no longer be able to add cases where the 
Court is unanimous, a larger fraction of the cases would be divisive. 
The Court could change the rule in the other direction and move to a 
Rule of Three. This is not without precedent. In his testimony before the 
Senate regarding the Judges’ Bill of 1925, Justice Van Devanter noted that 
cert was sometimes granted if only three Justices were in favor.259 The Court 
already grants cert with only three votes to grant if a fourth offers a Join-3,
and until the retirement of Justice Brennan, three Justices were sufficient to 
force the Court to postpone decisions on certiorari pending the outcome of 
another case.260
Moving to a Rule of Three would almost certainly increase the size of 
the docket. If the Rule of Four became a Rule of Three, assuming no changes 
to voting behavior,261 the Court would have taken another 148 cases during 
the first eight years of the Rehnquist Court.262 That works out to be 18.5 
additional cases a year.263 However, it is not entirely obvious if this would 
resolve the problem of a politicized Court. In many ways, this path would 
counter politics with more politics. The more extreme members of the usual 
majority would be able to press the Court to take more cases that may shift 
the law in their preferred direction. For the defensive-minded members of 
the minority, on the other hand, a Rule of Three would make it easier to stuff 
the docket full of unanimous cases or to better police deviations by lower 
courts. 
If the greater threat to the Court’s legitimacy is public perception of a 
politicized court due to a surfeit of 5-4 cases, then a Rule of Three could 
help. A Rule of Three makes these splits relatively less likely. Most of the 
cases the defensive-minded minority coalition puts on the docket would 
yield unanimity, which by the same logic should increase public confidence 
in the Court. When an aggressive three-member coalition overreaches, it is 
also more likely to lead to a 5-4 outcome than cases that already have four 
votes. In the latter case, if the cert coalition gains one defector or if it merely 
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keeps itself together, the result is a 5-4 case. In contrast, if three Justices
could grant cert, 5-4 cases at disposition only happen if one or two Justices
join the cert-granting minority. If the minority merely holds together, the 
result is 5-4. This suggests that cases that reach the docket with minimal 
support are less likely to lead to 5-4 outcomes under a Rule of Three than 
under the Rule of Four.
The second voting rule that could change is the tradition of voting in 
order of seniority, which appears to give the Chief Justice a first-mover 
advantage and gives him a great deal of influence in the cert process.264 This 
finding relates to other recent work that notes that the Chief’s influence is 
often underestimated and may be unjustified.265 The particular advantage the 
Chief has in agenda setting is that he votes first. Other Justices seem to queue 
off of his vote, and as such, the Chief’s vote carries more weight than others.
One way to dilute this advantage would be to have the Justices vote 
simultaneously. The problem with this procedure is that for it to be truly 
effective, the Justices could not discuss the decision amongst themselves. 
Discussions in conference are structured according to seniority, so the Chief 
Justice speaks first.266 Even if the actual vote were simultaneous, the Chief 
would retain a first-mover advantage by speaking first. Since the Court is a 
deliberative body, it seems too high a price to pay to force it to not deliberate. 
So long as the Justices vote sequentially, there will be an opportunity for 
Justices to take cues from the first speaker. If simultaneous voting is off the 
table, then cue taking will always be a concern. But steps could be taken to 
minimize this danger by restructuring the discussion and voting process. 
Social scientists are fond of a random recognition rule.267 If the Chief 
randomly called on a Justice to begin (and then continue) conversation about 
a petition, the first-mover advantage would be dispersed among the different 
Justices. This would not cancel the advantage, though it would mean the 
advantage would not be concentrated in the hands of the Chief. It would also 
have the salutary benefit of inducing Justices to come prepared to discuss 
every petition. As it stands, a Justice that is not up to speed on a case can 
glean information from the Chief’s comments and free ride. If there were a 
chance the Justice would have to begin the conversation, there would be 
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77 AM. ECON. REV. 303 (1987); David P. Baron & John A. Ferejohn, Bargaining in Legislatures, 83 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1181 (1989).
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additional incentive to carefully study the petition and come to an 
independent conclusion before the conference. If the Justices were to do this, 
they would likely form stronger prior beliefs about the petitions, and this 
would limit the first-mover advantage.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to imagine Chief Justice Roberts managing 
conferences with the aid of a randomization machine. Still, the Court already 
has institutional structures that could be adapted to dilute the Chief’s 
first-mover advantage. Justices are assigned managerial responsibilities over 
different circuits.268 The Court could easily restructure discussion of cert 
petitions so that the Justice that oversees the circuit where a case originates 
begins the conversation. This would not end the first-speaker advantage, but 
it would end the Chief’s monopoly on that advantage.269
4. Creating External Bodies to Review Petitions
From time to time, scholars have suggested creating an external body to 
help manage the Court’s agenda-setting process. For example, Estreicher 
and Sexton suggested a “second look mechanism.”270 Their concern was to 
eliminate the cases from the docket that the Court should not take.271 Under 
their proposal, the Court would vote first in conference, and any case 
receiving four votes would be submitted to “an independent staff of the 
caliber of the Justices’ clerks, headed by a leading senior member of the 
Supreme Court bar.”272 Once vetted by that commission, the case would be 
returned to the Court with the report of the commission, and the Justices
would vote a second time.273
Paul Carrington and Roger Cramton argue for a commission of thirteen 
Article III judges empowered to “select[] . . . cases . . . that the Court would 
be obliged to decide.”274 Their recommendation would require the Court to 
take the cases referred by the commission. Sanford Levinson suggests 
broadening the membership of this commission to include state judges and 
public representatives.275 His view that the Court would be well served by 
input from a broader range of views is well taken. 
However, as Kathryn Watts had suggested, employing non-Article III 
judges on such a commission would raise constitutional concerns about 
                                                                                                                         
268 28 U.S.C. § 42 (2012).
269 The Court could randomize which Justice leads off discussion on each case. But this seems to 
create implementation problems that the Court would most likely find not worth the effort to undertake. 
270 Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 10, at 802–03.
271 Id. at 791.
272 Id. at 802.
273 Id. at 803. 
274 Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the Judicial 
Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 632 (2009). 
275 Sanford Levinson, Assessing the Supreme Court’s Current Caseload: A Question of Law or 
Politics?, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 99, 111 (2010), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/assessing-the-
supreme-courts-current-caseload-a-question-of-law-or-politics [https://perma.cc/YVD3-FSHS].
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delegating government powers to nongovernmental actors or might violate 
the “oneness” principle of Article III. 276 Further, a blunt legal requirement 
that the Justices decide the cases selected by this commission prevents 
Justices from weighing in, and denies the process the benefit of their 
perspectives and their concerns for the Court as an institution.
If Carrington and Crampton’s proposal were amended to provide 
recommendations instead of mandates, there would be fewer issues with 
adding state judges, retired Justices, or others. The recommendations 
themselves could then inform the Court’s internal deliberation on certiorari. 
The commission’s work would save the Court time, as the cert pool would 
largely become redundant. Further, by turning the cert process over to 
professionals, the work should be done more efficiently and with less 
concern that the recommendations reflect the idiosyncratic preferences of a 
clerk two years removed from law school.277
The commission’s review of individual petitions would be made a 
matter of public record. These reports would provide members of the 
Supreme Court bar a wealth of information about what makes a case 
certworthy. It may also have a beneficial effect of making frivolous appeals 
less likely, as lawyers may be less inclined to recommend a costly certiorari 
petition to a client when it is likely that the staff report will subsequently tell 
the client that her attorney was wasting her money. Most importantly, 
releasing these recommendations and reports promotes greater transparency. 
Thus, the commission could achieve the benefits sought by reformers who 
have called on the Court to clarify rules or explain cert decisions.
A public commission would add a great deal of transparency to the 
process while reducing the amount of time Justices and clerks must spend 
on reviewing cert petitions. This should increase the capacity of the Court to 
take additional cases and increase the chances that the cases they do take 
will not merely reflect the Justices’ ideological preferences.  This 
transparency would go a long way to reduce the danger of appearing biased 
in taking cases.
CONCLUSION
The cert process is a hugely important but poorly understood part of the 
Supreme Court as an institution. Currently, the Justices use this process to 
advance their own ideological agendas. Over two-thirds of the Justices’ 
votes are attributable to ideology.278 However, Justices vary greatly in how 
ideological they are. Further, there is strong, if only suggestive, evidence 
                                                                                                                         
276 Watts, supra note 240, at 21 n.112.
277 Id. at 631–32. 
278 See supra Part II.D (discussing the impact of individual Justices’ ideology on the docket).
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that this could reflect a previously unrecognized power of the Chief Justice 
to affect the docket.279
The politicization of the cert process undermines the Court’s legitimacy 
and particularly its power of judicial review. Accordingly, the Article 
proposes a novel solution to the problem: a First Look Commission that 
would make recommendations to the Court as to which cases to take and 
help Congress better use its Article III power over the Court’s jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                                         
279 See supra Part II.E (discussing the power of the Chief Justice to shape the law). 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
The model I propose is a generalization of the traditional rollcall voting 
framework. Justices are ? ? ????? ? ? ? ? ?? and cases are ? ? ????? ? ? ? ? ??. First, 
let ???? be Justice ?’s vote at cert in case ?. Let ?? be a vector of case-specific 
covariates and ?? be a vector of Justice-specific coefficients. Justices vary in 
how much they dislike taking cases in two ways. First, taking any case 
imposes a cost of ?? on Justice ?. Second, Justices have differing thresholds, 
??, for moving from a Join-3 to a full grant. Finally, let ?? be the common 
payoff from case ? across all Justices. 
The substantive interpretations of these values are that more negative 
values of ?? imply Justices prefer to take fewer cases, higher values of ?? are 
associated with a Justice being more liberal with using Join-3 votes as a tool, 
and ?? is the intrinsic certworthiness of a case recognized by all Justices. 
Including the product of Justice-specific coefficients and case-specific 
covariates, ???? allows Justices to have idiosyncratic differences in their 
views of what makes a case certworthy. For instance, ?? will capture the 
average certworthiness of a death penalty case, but the interaction term ?????
will allow Justice Marshall to place greater weight on death penalty cases 
than some other Justices.
Payoffs from ideology are modeled as follows. Judicial decision-making 
from the cert stage through the dispositional stage is a two-stage game. In 
the first round, the Court collectively decides to grant or deny certiorari. If 
the Justices grant cert, the Court decides the case in stage two. The important 
assumption is that Justices share a common view of what is likely to happen 
at the second stage.
Suppose the lower courts are split on an issue, and the rule applied in a 
given case is a random draw from a commonly known distribution ?????????
with finite mean and variance ???? and ?????, respectively. Further, assume 
that Justices share a common belief that, if they Court takes the case, the 
majority will issue a new rule ?? that lower courts will subsequently apply 
by drawing policies from some known distribution ?????????with mean and 
variance ???? and ?????.
Making the standard assumption that Justices face quadratic losses, 
suppose the expected ideological payoff to Justice ? if the Court takes case ?
is 
2018] THE SUPREME COURT’S POLITICAL DOCKET 637
???????????? ? ? ?
?
? ??? ? ???
?????????????
?
? ???? ???
? ? ??? ? ??????????????????
?
? ?????
? ? ??? ? ??????????????
?
? ? ???????????????
?
? ??? ???
? ? ??????? ? ?????
? ??? ???
? ? ????? ? ??????
where ???? ? ? ???????????????? ? ???
?? ? ?????.
Since by definition the majority policy prevails at the second stage, the 
decision Justices face at cert is between the expected payoff just recovered 
and the value of the current state of affairs. The expected utility from 
maintaining the current state of the law is 
??????????? ? ? ?
?
? ??? ? ???
?????????????
?
? ??? ???
? ? ????? ? ??????
where ???? ? ? ???????????????? ? ???
?? ? ?????.
I can now apply the standard random utility framework and write down 
an individual Justice’s utility functions as
????????? ? ???????????? ? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ? ?????????
???????? ? ??????????? ? ????????
I now operationalize this model similar to Clinton et al. (2004).280
                                                                                                                         
280 See Clinton et al., supra note 25 (using congressional votes for statistical analysis of rollcall 
data).
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????? ? ????????? ? ????????
? ?? ???
?? ? ????? ? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ? ??????? ? ????? ? ????????
? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ? ??????? ? ????? ? ????????
? ?? ? ?? ? ?????
? ? ???? ? ????????
where ?? ? ?? ????? ? ????? ? ?? ? ????
?? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????? ?
??, ?? ? ???? ? ???? , and ???????? ? ?????? is a policy shock where ???????? ?
???????? ? ?????????.
The following model simply says that when the latent variable ????? ,
which represents the expected net payoff from taking a case, is negative, the 
Justice will vote to deny. If the payoff is sufficiently high enough, the Justice 
will vote to grant. If the latent variable is between zero and the floor for a 
grant, the Justice will vote to Join-3.
Model 1
???????? ? ?
???????? ???????? ? ?
????????? ???? ? ????? ? ??
????????? ???????? ? ??
Notice the substantive impact of the ?? term in equation for ????? above. 
First, when ?? is large and a case is intrinsically more certworthy, the Justice
is more likely to vote to take the case. When the lower courts are generally 
confused about the law, they have a higher variance, which increases ????
and through that ??. This makes every Justice more likely to vote to take a 
case. Similarly, when Justices are confident they can predict the outcome of 
the case, they are more willing, ceteris paribus, to take the case, because the 
variance ????? is smaller. This difference in variance nicely represents the 
Court’s concern with circuit splits and its desire to take cases where it can 
bring clarity.
For the analysis in the Article, the relevant term is ?? ? ???? ? ????,
which is the signed distance between the mean of the two distributions, ??
and ??. If ?? ? ?, then the expected policy that results from taking the case 
is to the right of the current law.
I estimate Model 1 in a standard Bayesian framework using a Gibbs 
sampler. After a burn-in of 1,000 runs, I collect 200 draws from the relevant 
posteriors by running the sampler 2,000 additional times and thinning every 
ten. At each iteration, I save the value of all components of ????? .
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I generate results in Part I.C by looking first at the sum of the ideological 
parameters, ???????? ???????
? ? ????, where the ideological variables are 
Blackmun’s clerks’ recommendations, the product of the Justices’ ideal 
points, and the case-specific gap parameter. If that sum is negative, then the 
purely ideological Justice votes to deny. If it is positive, the purely 
ideological Justice votes in favor of cert. Note that for this analysis, a Join-
3 is treated as a vote to grant. Similarly, if the nonideological components 
are negative, a Justice that does not care about ideology votes to deny, but if 
they are positive, the Justice who does not care about ideology would vote 
to grant. If both components are greater (less) than zero, then the Justice’s 
vote is overdetermined. If the ideology part correctly predicts the vote and 
the nonideological part does not, then ideology is necessary to predict the 
vote. If ideology alone gets it wrong but the non-ideological factors get it 
right, then case importance is necessary to predict the vote. If a case is 
overdetermined, then both ideological and importance factors are sufficient 
to predict the vote.
For Part I.D, I run the model on all cases and subset the results into two 
groups: memo recommends grant; recommends deny. The figure shows the 
average value of ?? for each of the 200 draws from the sampler for the two 
subsets.
For Part I.E, the analysis is the same but with different subsets. The first 
chart shows the average ?? value for cases actually granted and denied. Later 
figures show the average values for granted and denied subsets of cases the 
clerks recommended granting and denying, respectively.
For Part I.F, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s votes enter the model as data. If 
Rehnquist voted to deny, then the variable takes on a value of -1. If he voted 
to Join-3 or to Grant, the variable takes on a value of 1. I then re-run model 
1, but this time instead of Rehnquist’s votes being a dependent variable, they 
are part of the data, ??. The model returns results based on the votes of the 
other eight Justices. The figure shows the coefficient on the Rehnquist-vote 
variable for the other Justices. To calculate how many votes changed 
consistent with Rehnquist’s vote, I predict every Justice’s vote in every case 
using the full model and again after subtracting off the product of the 
Justice’s Rehnquist-vote coefficient and the value of Rehnquist’s vote (???.
I compare the proportion of correctly predicted votes from each set of 
predictions and report the results.

